

Francis Hargrave

Boarwell count



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John G. D. L.
Francis THE Hargrave

F A B L E

OF THE

LIONS SHARE,

Verified in the Pretended

P A R T I T I O N

OF THE

Spanish Monarchy. R

Done from the Original printed at Vienna.

P A R T I

L O N D O N,

Printed in the Year 1701.

E. A. B. E.

LONG'S SHARE

Warrant of the Treasury

OF THE

NAVY

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Warrant of the Treasury

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The Advertisement prefix'd to the
German Edition.

THE Author of these Papers shews,
That the Succession of Spain is not a
particular Controversy between the Em-
peror and Most Christian King, but a
Business of the utmost importance to all Europe,
and on which her Liberty or Slavery intirely
depends : That there is no way of restoring the
Ballance of Christendom, which is so necessary
for the Common Good, but by settling the whole
Monarchy of Spain upon the Arch-Duke ; and
that any kind of dismembring whatever, tho
France should not have one foot of ground for
her part, would prove sufficient to advance that
Crown to the Universal Monarchy. These
Truths he has prov'd by Arguments of such
force and evidence, as are sufficient to convince
even those who are under the strongest Delu-
sions and Prepossessions.

[illegible]

The Fable of the Lion's Share verified, &c.

WHEN the *French* Court express'd *Design of*
 so much Zeal for the Peace of *France in*
Reswick during the highest Prosperity of their Arms, 'twas easy *making the*
Peace of
Reswick.
 to foresee that they were meditating other Con-
 quests under the favour of that Peace, which
 should be less expensive, and of more importance
 than any they could promise to themselves by
 continuing the War: For to presume they acted
 by a Motive of Charity to give Peace to *Christen-*
dom, as they would have us believe, is altogether
 inconsistent with their preceding Conduct; since
 nothing is more notoriously evident, than that
 they alone, by their insatiable Ambition, have
 depriv'd *Europe* of that Blessing, throughout the
 whole Course of this, and the preceding Reign.
 They were well inform'd, that *England* and the
United Provinces were much exhausted; and that
 the Emperor, having born the weight of the
Turkish War for fourteen years, was no longer
 able to maintain his Troops upon the *Rhine*.
 They had put an end to the most troublesom and
 expensive part of the War by an Agreement
 with *Savoy*: Yet they were resolv'd to have a
 Peace, they press'd it vehemently, and concluded
 one with disadvantage. They had already bought
 a Peace from the Duke of *Savoy* by restoring
Pignerol,

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Pignerol, in hopes that his Separation from the Confederates, would facilitate the general one: and in this they sacrificed their Ally King *James*, who had put himself under their Protection, to their common Enemy *R— G—* with whom they enter'd into private Measures for a stricter Alliance; by virtue of which, the undoubted Right of the Emperor and his Male Line to the Succession of *Spain*, was to be sacrificed in requital, as appear'd soon after.

That the Peace was disadvantageous to the *French*, is evident by the Obligation they were under to restore so many Places of importance, which had cost vast Sums of Money to take and fortify; besides others that were to be demolish'd, to the great weakening of their Frontiers. But the vast Designs they had form'd, deserv'd all these Sacrifices. The Catholick King was in such a languishing Condition, as might carry him every hour to the Grave, and they had his Succession in view. The Continuation of the War would have kept the two great * Maritim Powers united to the Emperor and King of *Spain*, by virtue of their Alliance; which was so prejudicial to *France*, and yet no way to be dissolv'd but by a Peace, that it became absolutely necessary to make one. The Conferences of the *Mareschal de Boufflers* with the E. of P. the Embassy of the Earl to *France*, and the extraordinary Honours done him there, were the forerunners of the Dissolution of the Confederacy, and of the Measures taken between the *French* Court and those Powers to se-

* England
and Hol-
land.

Design of France in of *Bavaria*.

declaring
for the E-
lectoral
Prince of
Bavaria.

This Expedient, however unjust, seem'd to the two Confederated Nations the most proper means to bring them out of an expensive War with Honour,

Honour, and at the same time to prevent the *French* from seizing the Succession of *Spain*. But on the other side, it was favourable to *France*, by depriving the Emperor of his Right; and putting the *French* King into a condition to appropriate to himself, under the Name of the Electoral Prince, whatever he should think convenient. Suitable to this view it could not but be advantageous to *France* to disarm her Enemies, which was to be the first fruits of the Peace. For they were sure the *English* Nation would never suffer their King to keep up an Army without necessity; and that the *United Provinces* would upon the Conclusion of the Treaty reduce their Troops, and apply themselves to the reestablishment of their Trade. And as to the *German* Princes, they presum'd, that when they should find themselves depriv'd of the Supplies they used to receive from those Nations, and of the Winter-quarters which were assign'd them by the Emperor, they would disarm also; and that they alone remaining in Arms, and by means of the Peace furnish'd with sufficient opportunities of embroiling Affairs in *Spain*, *Germany*, *England*, and the *North*, would find no difficulty in the Execution of their great Designs upon the death of the King of *Spain*, which they thought near at hand. The Disarming succeeded to their Expectation; and in less than six months they saw their Enemies out of a condition to hurt them, which made them raise their thoughts to higher things than they had before projected. To make the best use therefore of this favourable Conjuncture, after they had broken a few useless Troops, and sent home the Militia, which they could raise again at pleasure, they marched the best of their Troops towards the *Pyrenees*, fitted out Fleets of Ships and Gallies

to

to cruize upon the Coasts of *Spain* and *Italy*, and convey'd Men, disguis'd like *Spaniards*, into the City of *Madrid*, to assist their Ambassador, who by his Intrigues had already put that Court into the utmost Confusion.

In this posture of Affairs the Catholick King recovers, almost miraculously; which, with the Disposition that appear'd towards a speedy Conclusion of a Truce between the Emperor and the *Turk*, made the Court of *France* slacken its pace, lest his Catholick Majesty (who had constantly refus'd to declare himself in favour of the Electoral Prince) should enter into Measures with the Emperor, arm'd and victorious, to bring the Arch-Duke *Charles* into *Spain*: Therefore since they could not flatter themselves any longer with hopes of obtaining their Ends without the Assistance of *England* and *Holland* (who had engag'd no farther than for the Electoral Prince) they enter'd upon a Negotiation with them upon that Project; and covering their Ambition under the specious pretence of the Publick Good, and preservation of Peace, were compassing their main Design by oblique and indirect ways and methods.

'Tis evident, that by engaging the two Maritime Powers, and the Elector of *Bavaria*, to secure the Succession of *Spain* to the Electoral Prince, they should actually embroil them with the Emperor, whose Power by that means would be so diminish'd, that either he would be oblig'd to treat privately with *France* upon such terms as he could get; or else, under pretence of putting the Electoral Prince into possession, they themselves would seize into their hands all the best Places, in order to leave him only what they pleas'd.

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2. The Council of *Spain* seeing the Emperor disabled by this League from maintaining his Right by Arms, and justly fearing their Monarchy would be dismembred, could no way avoid to admit the Electoral Prince; and so fall into the Snare laid for them.

3. Most of the States of *Europe*; interesting themselves no farther than to prevent the Union of the *Spanish* Monarchy to that of *France*, would entertain less jealousy of the Possession they should take in the Name of the Electoral Prince. And thus, when they had posted themselves in *Spain* and *Italy*; either a New War must be made to drive them out again, or they must have had by an Agreement prejudicial to all *Europe*, whatever they should think convenient for themselves, in order to save the rest for that Prince: and for this they had made early provision; for we now certainly know that they had already stipulated with the Elector of *Bavaria*, that the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily* which they have so long coveted, should be yielded to them.

4. If the *Spaniards* and Maritim Powers should acknowledg the Prince Electoral's Right to the Crown of *Spain*, notwithstanding the Archdutchess his Mother's Renunciation of all her Rights to the *Spanish* Monarchy, which was made after the most Solemn manner, in favour of the Emperor and his Descendants of the Male Line; this would be to create a Title in themselves, to be disputed hereafter with that Prince, under the Name of the *Dauphin*, representing the Eldest Daughter of *Philip* the 4th; whereas the Electoral Prince represented only the Younger, the Renunciation of the Queen his Mother, as they would have given out, being of no more force against him; than that of the Archdutchess against her

Son.

son. 'Tis true some exceptions would have been made, but they would have taken an opportunity of confuting them by the Sword.

The Death of the Electoral Prince, which happened in the midst of these Noble Projects, cast the *French* and their Allies into new Perplexities. The most Christian King was fully convinc'd, that if he pretended to the whole Succession of *Spain* in order to incorporate those Dominions with his own Crown, he should arm all *Europe* against himself. And if he pretended to obtain it separate and independant for one of his Grandsons, his Allies would not fail to oppose him privately; and by corresponding secretly with the Emperor and Catholick King, be enabled to destroy the Foundation of his hopes. These Considerations mov'd him to propose several Expedients to dissipate their suspicions: whilst his Ambassador at *Madrid* endeavour'd to perswade the *Spaniards* by all the strength of Promises, Intrigues, and Bribes, to admit one of his Grandsons. But the Catholick King, and the Allies of *France* expressing their aversion to this project, he at last agreed with *R—G—* in another Expedient to determine this great Affair: which was, by way of provision, to divide the Succession of *Spain* between the *Dauphin*, and the Arch-duke *Charles*.

Design of
France in
the Treaty
of Partiti-
on.

This Treaty, tho mysteriously conceal'd, took wind, and awaken'd the Suspicions of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*. Yet there was some reason to doubt; first, because *R—G—* and two or three Persons alone of the greatest Figure in *Holland*, were said to be concern'd: and then, a Fact of such Enormity and Injustice wanted all appearance of probability. But the most Christian King finding himself oblig'd to maintain great Forces,

Forces, that exhausted his Treasures, in expectation of a Succession which the Recovery of the Catholick King render'd every day more uncertain and remote; and apprehending on the other hand by reason of his great Age, that if he should come to die without finishing this important-Enterprise, the *Dauphin* might find himself too weak, or of too little credit to sustain it with success, he thought himself necessitated to put all to hazard, by making the Treaty publick, with the Circumstances which every Man knows.

How rash soever the Publishing of this Treaty may seem, it cannot be said to have been resolv'd without mature deliberation. The State of Affairs in *Europe* was inviting. *Spain* in the utmost perplexity and confusion lay under the Terror of his Arms, which threatned them by Sea and Land: all their Places unprovided, and their Frontiers open on all sides. The great Maritime Powers, from whom they ought to expect most, disarm'd, and in all appearance brought over to support the Treaty. These were such Considerations as might well oblige the *Spaniards* to think the Admission of a Son of *France* to the Crown of *Spain*, to be a Tolerable thing in the Danger they were in of being torn in pieces. And this was presently perceiv'd by the *French* to be the worst that could happen. There was a Party form'd in *Spain*, to promote this Admission; for many principal Persons among the Clergy had already swallowed the bait, through a vain desire of ease and quiet, which they cover'd with the specious pretext of Religion. Possibly, there was yet a greater Party among the *Grandeess*, of whom one part trembled at the Danger of losing all by resistance, and the other was seduced by hopes of reaping advantages from the Change. As

Reasons of France for publishing the Treaty of Partition.

to the Emperor, they saw him sufficiently employ'd, in regulating his Frontiers with the *Turk*, and disbanding part of his Forces, in order to recruit his Treasures. So that they thought themselves secure from him; especially considering, that the Divisions which had been form'd in the Empire about the Ninth Electorate, together with the Northern War; in which they doubted not to engage him, would in all appearance put him out of a Condition to think upon things abroad. Besides all these favourable Dispositions, they counted upon the good Fortune of the Monarchy, so often experienced in the rashest Attempts, and the Talent of the Nation for Negotiations and Intrigues; which has been verified by the most astonishing Effects, even by perswading Princes and States, with whom they have treated, to act in a direct Opposition to their most essential Interests.

According to these promising Ideas the *French* Court perswaded themselves, that the Publication of the Treaty could not but turn to their advantage. For the Emperor, finding himself abandon'd by his ancient Allies, and not daring to rely upon *Spain* in such extreme confusion, would either be forc'd to accept his Lot, rather than lose all; and then they knew they should be Masters of every thing in the *Spanish* Monarchy that was convenient for them at present, with certain hopes of the rest afterwards; in which no other difficulty could arise but from the *Spaniards*, who not daring to trust the Emperor after this acceptance, would find no other way to save themselves, than by giving their Crown to a Prince of *France*; upon which offer, the *French* would seem difficult, and disputing the Conditions, would endeavour either to draw them into a

Depen-

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Dependance, or tear away the *Spanish Netherlands* to incorporate them with the Crown of *France* : Or, on the contrary, if the Emperor should refuse to accept the Treaty, which they thought improbable, then they trusted to *R—G—* and the Maritim Powers, who had engag'd to see the Conditions perform'd, and doubted not to bring in divers other Princes and States of *Europe*, decoying some of them with the Arch-duke's Lot, and others with vain promises of a Part in the Plunder, thinking by these means to break all the Measures of the Emperor and King of *Spain*.

Under these auspicious Influences, we saw that Treaty published, which is now become the Scandal of all *Europe*. A Treaty which may be justly call'd, not only a Conspiracy against the *Austrian* Family, but against the Liberties of *Christianity* ; directly tending to enslave Mankind to the House of *France*. This is the Design of that Treaty ; irregular in every part, unjust in substance, and of the most dangerous consequence to all Sovereigns, who may with reason dread the Force of this Example. Henceforward, if nothing more be necessary to regulate Successions than a Superior Force, and a Combination of three or more powerful Princes, what methods of Caution can they possibly take to secure their Dominions to their Children or Families ? The King of *Spain* is not yet in his fortieth year ; he is within the Age of having Children, and his Health may be restor'd by that Grace of God, which has been so visible in his preservation. But he lives too long, in the Opinion of the *French*, who have waited for his death, ever since he was born : and not daring to pretend to the whole Succession, lest all *Europe* should take the Alarm, they engage *R—G—* and two

The Injustice, and Enormity of the Partition Treaty.

or three leading Men in the Government of the United Provinces, whom they had gain'd, to consent, that they should take either by force or Treaty what they judg'd most convenient for them, leaving only for form sake such a Share to the Emperor's second Son, as they were sure to tear from him soon after. Thus trampling under foot the Rules of Law and Equity, and measuring all by their Ambition, they secure to themselves a Throne which is not vacant, and to which they have no right, in prejudice of the true Heir.

But this is not all. They carry the Attempt yet farther; and no way trouble themselves about the Consent or Refusal of the actual Possessor of so many Kingdoms and States; as if he was already struck out of the Book of the Living; or as if, by being childless, he had forfeited all right of inquiring who ought to succeed him. Then, as to his Kingdoms and Dominions, tho the Disposing of them is a thing that immediately concerns them, and determines their Happiness or Misery; they are no more regarded in the Treaty, than if they were so many Kingdoms of *Yvetot*, or Republicks of *San Marino*. The Treaty was propos'd to the Emperor and King of *Spain*, not as a Project upon which they had liberty to deliberate; but as a fix'd Decree, and irrevocable Sentence, to which they must submit blindly and without reply. There is not the least mention made, that the Kingdoms and States to be divided shall be preserved by their new Masters, in the enjoyment of their Laws, Customs, Immunities and Privileges; a Favour that might have been stipulated for them, tho it had been done only for form sake, and to keep them out of despair; for we know well enough that

that no such thing is to be expected from *France*.

The Haughty and Despotical manner of the *French*, in giving the two Monarchs notice of the Treaty, is yet more extraordinary. The Marquess *de Villars* presents it to the Emperor, and prescribes the Term of three months, to consider whether he will accept or refuse the Lot which was assign'd therein to the Arch-duke *Charles*, his second Son; declaring at the same time, that unless he accept within the term limited, they will give it to another. And for the Catholick King, the Marquess *de Torcy*, upon the delivery of the Treaty to his Ambassador at *Paris*, declares drily and without farther compliment, that this Office was perform'd, in order to know whether his Majesty would consent to the Partition, or not: that, in the First case, they would be content; if otherwise, such measures would be taken as should be thought most convenient. 'Tis left to the Judgment of all impartial Men, if this be not the Language of a Master, and a Dictatorian way of prescribing Laws in the utmost extent of Sovereign Authority. But such is the present Stile of the *French* Court; from whence one may easily infer, with what kind of Air they will speak and act, if the Treaty succeed to their expectation. But they go yet farther: for they will not be contented to dispose of the King of *Spain's* Dominions as they please, and to pronounce Sentence against him with the highest indignity: They affirm in the Treaty, that the right of Succession belongs to the Sons of the Emperor, and the Dauphin of *France*; yet notwithstanding this Acknowledgment, 'tis stipulated at the End of the Seventh Article, that if the Emperor, and the two Princes his Sons shall refuse to admit the prescrib'd Partition, the two Kings, and

and the States General will nominate another Prince, to whom the Share design'd for the Archduke shall be given. Can any thing be more unjust and outrageous? They first deprive the Emperor of his right to the whole; then they divide the whole between his second Son the Archduke and the *Dauphin* of *France*, giving all the advantage to the last; and lastly, they threaten his Imperial Majesty, that unless he comply, they will give his Son's part to a third Person, in punishment of his offence.

Let Men turn this Proceeding which way they please, they will not find such an example of Injustice and Arrogance, in either Christian or Profane History. Surprisals, breach of Treaties, Invasions and desolation of Countries, are Attempts that cry aloud for Vengeance: and *France* has known how to make use of them with success, throughout the whole course of the present Reign: but that kind of hostile Actions is usually follow'd by others of like nature; Men oppose Force to Force, and when a War is begun, each Party endeavours to take all advantages against their Enemies. Here, the case is different. Injustice and Surprisal are disguis'd under the Name of Peace; waylaying another Prince is said to be convenient for *Europe*, and Usurpation is cover'd with the deceitful mask of an amicable Agreement. But what Law, or what Right had the three contracting Powers, to assume this Authority, and to constitute themselves Sovereign Judges of so vast an Inheritance; to overthrow the order of Succession that had been so firmly establish'd, and to adjudg the best part to *France*, that had renounc'd all by a Solemn Treaty? Strange Tribunal! where a Party is principal Judg, and where the two others seduc'd by mistaken interests,

Interests, blindly subscribe his unjust Decisions. And indeed, who could ever have thought that *R — G —* should have engag'd with his most dangerous and implacable Enemy, to authorize such an enormous Attempt, so prejudicial to all *Europe*, and to his own People in particular? 'Tis upon this Prince, and his Creatures in *Holland*, that the blame must fall: For, as to the *French*, they have been so long in the possession of attempting any thing to compass their Ends, that nothing now can be surprizing which comes from them. But for *R — G —* and the *States General*, who can see them at the head of this Treaty without Emotion? What Titles or Characters do they bear to enable them to determine of Successions, especially that of *Spain*? I desire to be excused from explaining my self farther concerning their Conduct; for I cannot perswade my self, that a Prince so clear-sighted as *R — G —* can depart from the Interests of his Crown, as well as those of a Commonwealth, which is intirely devoted to him, to enter into so pernicious a Conjunction with *France*, unless he had some farther prospect of Affairs: Possibly he saw that Crown upon the point of breaking into a War, in order to make good its Pretensions, at a time when he was unprepar'd, and when the Emperor and King of *Spain* thought of nothing less than a Rupture: From whence we are to presume that he design'd, like a wise Politician, to charm the Storm by way of Negotiation; and upon this Principle was not unwilling that the *French* should publish the Treaty, to the end that the House of *Austria* might take such measures as they should think most convenient, keeping himself upon the reserve, and the whole business in suspense during the Life of the Catholick King. This is

the turn and interpretation that may be given to the several steps made by him, in conjunction with those of the *United Provinces*: And as nothing but time can discover the Truth, I think my self oblig'd to wait, that I may not be found to decide rashly in so nice a Point. However this be, the Treaty appear'd under the Names of the most Christian King, the K. of *G. B.* and the *States General*, the two last becoming Guarantees for its performance; and, which is yet more surprizing, appear'd under the deceitful colour of the Publick Good and Peace of *Europe*: Gross Illusion! the Mask falling off even at the fourth Article.

Absurdities of the Motives to this Treaty.

If one should ask these three Powers what was the Object of their Union, they answer in the second Article, *To maintain the general Tranquillity of Europe*: And if we would know what was the cause of their Apprehensions, they will presently reply, *They could not see without grief, that the state of the King of Spain's Health had for some time been so languishing, that the Life of that Prince is in great danger; tho they cannot think upon this Event without Affliction, by reason of the sincere and unfeigned Friendship they have for him.* Hitherto all goes wonderfully well; nothing but Christian Charity, the desire of Peace, and dismal apprehensions of the Death of the Catholick King. Nay, in confirmation of the third Head, we may say, that his most Christian Majesty's Uneasiness about the Health of this good King was carried to some excess: for his design to send an Ambassador to *Madrid*, in order to be careful and vigilant about him, was the principal reason that mov'd him to press and conclude the Peace with disadvantage. This Peace was hardly ratified when his Ambassador appear'd at *Madrid*, to the astonishment of the

the whole Court ; and to satisfy his Master's impatience more punctually, laid the Post-road with his own Horses, causing his own Servants to ride as Postboys between *Madrid* and the Frontier, to the end he might be every hour inform'd without trusting to the *Spaniards*, about that Health which concern'd him so much. A little Head-ach, or a restless Night, was become the Subject of an Express. In a word, this officious Minister, seeing the *Spaniards* alarm'd about the Succession, omitted nothing that might put them out of doubt, letting them see at a distance great Armies upon their Frontiers, and Squadrons of Ships and Gallies cruizing upon the Coasts of *Spain* and *Italy*, all ready to decide that Question.

But to leave our Irony, and come to consider this *sincere and unfeigned Friendship* in the most essential Proofs on't we can find. In the year 1667. the most Christian King seeing this young King a Minor, without Defence, under the Guardianship of the Queen his Mother, whose Authority was travers'd by Court-Cabals ; and knowing that the Queen, without any distrust, relied upon the Faith of the *Pyrenean Treaty*, and the precise and repeated Assurances of his Ambassador the Archbishop of *Ambrun*, that his great Preparations were not design'd against any of the Dominions of the King her Son, he fell upon the *Spanish Netherlands* on a sudden, penetrated into the heart of 'em, and would have subdued them infallibly, if *England*, *Sweden*, and the *United Provinces*, had not put themselves in a condition to hinder him. This Invasion he made without any such denunciation of War as the Law of Nations, and Customs of all civiliz'd People prescrib'd, contrary to the most solemn Promises made by his Ambassador in his Name, and against

the plain meaning of the *Pyrenean Treaty*, Article 24. *Any Rupture happening between the two Crowns, six months time shall be given on each side to draw out, and transport Goods, Persons, &c.*

But what could stop the *French Court* when so fair an opportunity was offer'd? yet for forms sake, the most Christian King, when his Troops were actually marching towards the *Low-Countries*, and himself ready to follow, dispatch'd an Express to his Ambassador with a Letter and Manifesto to be presented to the Queen: And as if the Credit of that Manifesto forged by a Mercenary Pen, had been sufficient to justify the Enormity of that Invasion, he departed without expecting an Answer; that he might take all the advantages of a Surprise. His Letter was dated the 8th of *May*, and Hostilities began on his side ten days after. Let all Men judg how great the Grief of this afflicted Queen must of necessity be upon the News of a War so little expected: She had lost the King her Husband, and found nothing disposed to resist so powerful an Enemy. In this condition all that she could do was, to offer Terms of Accommodation: But Fortune had so much favour'd the impetuous Violence of *Lewis's Arms*, that he would not hearken to any. And if afterwards he was contented to receive Proposals, 'twas for fear of those Leagues which he saw forming against him on all sides, and upon condition he should keep the greatest part of what he had usurp'd.

These were some of the first Marks of the *sincere and unfeigned Friendship* of his most Christian Majesty towards a King who was not only a Minor, but his own Brother-in-law, and Cousin German, to whom consequently he ought to have been both Father and Guardian. But this was not enough; for when in the year 1672. he had attack'd the

United

United Provinces in revenge for the care they had taken to preserve the *Spanish Netherlands*, and the Catholick King had assisted them, as by Treaty he was oblig'd, he on a sudden abandon'd all the Conquests he had made, consisting of forty or fifty strong Places, besides a vast extent of Land, to turn the strength of his Armies against the ruinous Remains of that miserable Country, in order to compleat the Conquest of it. The Emperor with his Allies snatch'd this Prey out of his hands, but were forced to sacrifice by the Peace of *Nimeghen* all the Frontier Places he had taken, by which means he became Master of the Avenues, and the Country still remains open and expos'd to his Invasions. And indeed from the time of that fatal Treaty, to the last at *Reswick*, all manner of Rapine and Plundering has been permitted by him, to ruin what he could not take.

During the interval which passed between the Treaty of *Nimeghen* and the beginning of the late War, and which was more fatal to *Spain* than an open Rupture, the *French* Court began to show what they are in time of Prosperity, when all things yield to their Genius and Ambition: They had already divided their Enemies at the Treaty, they had form'd a Revolt in *Hungary*, which kept the Emperor employ'd; and the Invasion of *Austria* by the *Turks*, undertaken at their Instigation, would, in their account, drive him out of his hereditary Countries. No Conjunction could ever be more favourable to the great Designs they had concerted with that cruel Enemy of *Christianity*, their antient Ally. Accordingly they took hold of the occasion, and gave the Catholick King fresh proofs of this sincere and unfeigned Friendship. They began with the Blockade of *Luxemburg*, which they had never dared to attack in time of

of open War; but that place not surrendring so soon as they expected, they besieg'd it in form, and took it. And as if it had not been enough treacherously to break a solemn Peace, they went on to compleat the ruin of the *Spanish Netherlands* by the most barbarous Extortions: They burnt, plunder'd, and exercis'd all manner of Violence to destroy the Country, and expel the Inhabitants; and were like to render it as frightful a Desert as they made of the *Palatinate* afterwards, if the frequent Defeats given to the *Turks*, and their fears of uniting the Empire, and the two Maritim Powers against them, by the continuation of their Ravages, had not forc'd them to a greater reserve.

But to what end should I renew the fatal Remembrance of those unhappy times, since we need only read the rest of the Treaty in question, to see the finishing strokes of the Work? His Catholick Majesty having no Children, the business of the Succession will infallibly raise a new War, if the most Christian King should maintain his own Pretensions, those of Monseigneur the Dauphin, or his Descendants, to the whole Succession of Spain; and if the Emperor should also insist upon his Pretensions, those of the King of the Romans, of the Arch-Duke his Second Son, or of his other Children Males or Females, to the said Succession. This Turn is admirable: The most Christian King by placing his Pretensions in a Parallel Line with the Right of the Emperor, aspires at first to an Equality; then proposing a Division, as a plausible means of preventing all Contestation, pretends to some Merit, by contenting himself with half instead of the whole. Indeed the Artifice is subtle, but a few words will easily discover the foundation of all his Pretensions.

The

The most Christian King has renounc'd the whole Monarchy of *Spain*, as well for himself as his Descendants, by stipulating and accepting the Renunciation of the Infanta *Maria Teresa*, made before she was his Wife; and thus violates this Contract, which was one of the most solemn and authentick that ever was made between Sovereigns: And all this founded upon the vainest Sophisms of the Bar, which are of no force against Publick Treaties; because these are Contracts made *bona fide*, authoriz'd by the Law of Nations among all People for the common benefit of Mankind. This is the sandy Foundation of his pretended Rights: He produc'd them in the *Manifesto* I mention'd before, and contenting himself with the formality, refer'd their Verification to the force of his Arms; which is a new method of Law, that has since been of admirable service to him in all his Designs. But what was there in that *Manifesto*, but a continued thread of captious Reasonings, which however supported by the most crafty Disguises, were only capable of imposing upon the simple and ignorant? The Author's Sentences are ambiguous, his Authorities remote from the Subject; and where he cites the Laws and their Interpreters, he omits the most important Passages, perverts the true sense of the words, and confounds the Sovereign with the Commoner. What shall I say more? he falsifies known History, affirms most apparent Falshoods, and denies the most evident Truths. Thus trampling under foot that Justice by which he stands condemn'd, proving nothing, and enlarging in false Deductions, he sheds the Poison of his Malignity, upon whatever has been most solemnly establish'd by the Law of Nations, for the common good both of Sovereigns and People, as

The Pretensions of France to the Monarchy of Spain groundless.

has

has been fully prov'd in the Answers to that Libel, to which the *French* have never dared to reply.

The most Christian King cannot be ignorant, that the Renunciation of Queen *Ann* of *Austria*, his Mother, which excludes both her and her Descendants from the Kingdoms, and other Dominions of the Crown of *Spain*, was the preliminary Condition of her Marriage with the King his Father, stipulated as such, and accepted in the Contract, after the most authentick manner : That this Renunciation was esteemed in *France* to be so just, and so necessary for the good of the Kingdom, that his Sister the * Princess *Elizabeth*, whose Marriage with *Philip* the Third King of *Spain* was then treating, was obliged to make the like, excluding both her and her Descendants from the Crown of *France* : In consequence of which the Princess *Henrietta Maria*, her younger Sister, did the same in the year 1624. upon her Marriage with *Charles I.* King of *England*, as the Historians of *France* witness. Which Examples, with many others of † elder times that might be added, are sufficient to prove, that there was neither Novelty nor Surprise, and consequently no Injustice in the Renunciation of Queen *Ann*; and that if *France*, which by virtue of their pretended Salique Law, excludes all Females from the Crown, did think convenient to take this Caution, the Argument will be much stronger, that *Spain*, which admits them, as far as their Admission may contribute to the Good of the Kingdom, should, and ought to take the same care for their own Preservation.

* Histoire
du Card.
de Richel
l.2. Gram-
mond, l.13.

† Du Hail-
lan tom.2.

Neither was it possible to conceal from so sagacious a Monarch, that the mutual Renunciations of the two Queens were not only the principal Conditions of the two Contracts, but that the

the subsequent Exclusions, stipulated in the same by the two Kings, ought to have the force of a Law, or Pragmatick Sanction within their Kingdoms; and that the Catholick King had perform'd this Condition on his part, by passing the Exclusion of his Daughter Queen *Ann* into a Law, at the desire of the States assembled at *Madrid* in the year 1619. as King *Lewis XIIIth* ought likewise to have done by causing it to be registred in the Parliament of *Paris*, according to the ancient usage of the Kingdom, and as he had solemnly oblig'd himself to do by the Contract. This Principle being thus establish'd, the most Christian King cannot pretend that his Marriage with the Queen *Maria Teresa* should give any more Right to his Son the *Dauphin*, and his Descendants, than that of Queen *Ann* his Mother with the King his Father, had given him, because the Renunciation of the late Queen his Wife refers to that of Queen *Ann*, is founded upon it, and agrees with it in every essential Point, as may be seen by comparing the two Contracts as far as they relate to the Renunciations, together with those Acts that were passed on both sides in consequence of them.

Who would not be surpriz'd at the Disingenuity of the Author of the *Manifesto*, who, to avoid the force of these Acts that destroy all his Sophisms, endeavours to seduce Men into a Belief, that the two Renunciations of the Infanta were only private Acts between the Catholick King and Her; and by a notorious Malignity would confound the Articles of the Contract, to which they relate, making but one Text of the 4th, 5th and 6th Articles, in order to corrupt the Sense, not only contrary to the Faith of a Publick Treaty, but much more to the Honour and

Glory of the most Christian King? And by the way, 'tis to be observ'd, that there are two sorts of Exclusions stipulated, as well in the Contract of the Queen *Maria Teresa*, as in that of Queen *Ann*, with this Clause, That the Infanta shall pass a separate Act of Renunciation upon each. By the first, she was to renounce her legal Share, in consideration of her Dowry mention'd in the second and fourth Articles: By the second, she renounc'd all manner of Right to the Kingdoms and Dominions of *Spain*, as may be seen in the fifth and sixth Articles; this last purely and simply in consideration of the Publick Good of the two Kingdoms, without any other reason, or any relation to her Dowry. The Infanta perform'd the Conditions; the Acts are publish'd, and the bare reading of them is sufficient to destroy all the false Suppositions of the *Manifesto*. Neither is it possible to see what Service he has done to himself or his Cause by his Falsification of the Articles of the Contract, and his disingenuous Endeavours to make the two Renunciations to depend upon the Payment of the Dowry, unless to expose himself to publick Laughter, for pretending to put the whole Monarchy of *Spain* to sale for the Sum of five hundred thousand Crowns, which, he says, were never paid. In my opinion he would have better consulted the Glory of his Master if he had not touch'd upon this string, since whatever delay there was of Payment, 'tis wholly to be imputed to him for not accomplishing an antecedent Obligation of the Contract, which was to approve and ratify the Renunciations in conjunction with the Queen immediately after their Marriage, and to see them register'd in the Parliament of *Paris*, as he had oblig'd himself to do. Besides these there

are other reasons, which I omit, as not properly belonging to my Subject.

But if we should think it possible that such essential Truths were disguis'd or conceal'd from the most Christian King, 'tis not rational to believe, they could deal so by him, in respect to the great Advantages he acquir'd by the *Pyrenean Treaty*, and were granted to him by the King of Spain, in consideration of his Marriage, which was the chief motive, and principal cause of the said Treaty, as the Peace of the two Kingdoms, that had been so long desir'd, was the Fruit of it. He must needs have seen in that Treaty, which he confirm'd by the Religion of a solemn Oath, that his Marriage-Contract, subscrib'd and ratified by himself the 24th of *Novemb.* in the preceding year, was to be of the same force and vigour, as being the principal and most worthy part of the Treaty, as may be seen more at large in the 33d Article. Which is more than sufficient to confound all the Exceptions of Fact and Right, which this vile Writer has advanc'd against its Validity.

I have insisted the more upon this Head, that I might shew the Vanity of the *French Pretensions* to the Succession of *Spain*; reserving those of the Emperor, to be explain'd in another place. In the mean time I return to the mysterious expressions of Tenderness, and considerations for the Publick Good, which the *French* and their Allies have used, to cover the Injustice and Enormity of the Partition Treaty. The third Article will make the Discovery. And as the two Kings, and the Lords States General, desire above all things the Preservation of the Publick Peace, and to prevent a new War in Europe, by an accommodation of the Disputes and Differences that might arise upon the Subject of the said Succession, or the Umbrage conceived

from the Union of too many Dominions under one Prince : They have thought good to take such necessary measures before hand, as may prevent the Evils, which the sad event of the Catholick King's death, without Children, might produce. Here the intriguing Scene begins to open ; and the Preservation of the publick Peace, with the desire of preventing a new War, that hitherto had acted in disguise, are preparing to make room for the Ambition of France, which will act its part without a Mask. No War will ensue about the Succession of Spain, unless caused by the most Christian King ; which he may avoid, if he will only keep himself within those Limits, which the Law of Nations, and Customs receiv'd among all civiliz'd People, have prescribed for the Decision of the Pretensions of Sovereign Powers. 'Tis an undoubted Principle among the Lawyers, and acknowledged by a * French Historian of good credit, that all Rights, Donations, Contracts and Inheritances, in which Sovereigns are concern'd, should be treated and determin'd by Maxims of Dignity, by the Publick Law, by Reason of State, and with regard to the Good of Kingdoms ; and not by the Vulgar Axioms of the Bar, much less by Conclusions dictated by Flattery. According to this Principle founded upon natural Equity, if the most Christian King thinks he has any well-grounded Pretensions to the Crown of Spain, 'tis his part to represent them in due form to the Catholick King, and require him to get them acknowledged by the States of those Kingdoms and Principalities that are under his dominion : which was the way taken in France, during the Famous Dispute about the Succession, between Edward King of England, and Philip de Valois ; and follow'd by Philip the 2d in pursuit of his Pretensions

* In-
vent del'
Hist. de
Fr. to. 1.

ons to the Kingdom of *Portugal*. Or if this Method did not please him; why would he not try the way of Arbitration, or the Decision of some Tribunal, to be agreed upon by both Parties? For if it be accounted sufficient among Sovereigns, to publish a Manifesto, and to verify their Pretensions by the Sword, what security will there be henceforward against the Invasions of a more powerful Neighbour? what Bank shall we oppose against the Ambition of *France*? who produce nothing but vain pretexts, and this only for the sake of formality, as we have seen but too often under this Reign.

Philip 2. who in this unworthy Manifesto stands accused, of giving no other reason for his Enterprize against *Portugal*, than that he knew the Justice of his Pretensions, and that Kings could find no Tribunal upon Earth but their own Conscience, acted in a very different manner upon that occasion. For he undertook nothing till he had consulted the most Famous Universities, and the most Learned among the Lawyers and Divines of *Europe*. And this, not under borrow'd Names, as his most Christian Majesty might do, in his case of the pretended Devolution; since by disguising the Quality of the Persons, and the Nature of the things in dispute, the very Substance of the Fact was destroy'd, and consequently the Good meaning of the Lawyers and Divines abus'd; but propos'd the Case just as it was, without any disguise; and by that fair and open way of proceeding obtain'd the Commendation of all the Historians of that time. He did yet more; for before he made any other step, he dispatch'd three Ambassadors, one after the other, to the Cardinal *Henry*, King of *Portugal*, and to the Estates of the Kingdom assembled at *Almeirim*, to inform them of his Right,

Right, and ask their approbation. And when the Kingdom became vacant, he waited Six months longer, to obtain by the Peoples consent, what the Estates had already voted him, as the Nearest and Eldest of the Male line; no right of Representation, nor any other Law in *Portugal*, being any way contrary to his admission. When afterwards he took Arms to put himself in possession, he was necessitated so to do, in order to oppose the Grand Prior of *Portugal*, who at the Instigation of *France* attempted to usurp the Kingdom. By these means that wise King establish'd the Justice of his Pretensions. Whether the most Christian King acted in like manner before he invaded the Low-Countrys in 1667, is left to the decision of all that will make the Comparison.

That great King, who has so often been the Object of the poisonous Passion of *French* Writers, gave an Example of Justice and Moderation, no less remarkable than the former, in a Case not unlike that which is now in question. The Infanta *Isabella*, his Daughter by *Elizabeth* of *France* who was his third Wife, and Daughter to *Henry* the 2^d, was considered as Heiress to the Crown of *France*, after the Death of her Uncle *Henry* the 3^d, who left no Children. The Queen her Mother had not renounc'd: She was the last of the Reigning Branch; so that she had the Right of Nature and Blood on her side, which the *French* make so much noise about, when they speak of the late Queen, tho they have no regard to those things among themselves. Besides, the Example of *Catherine* of *France* was favourable to her, who being Daughter to *Charles* the 6th of *France*, brought that Crown to *Henry* the 5th King of *England*, as well by virtue of her own Title, as in confirmation of the Antient Right which the
English

English derived from *Isabella* Daughter to *Philip* the Fair. This Settlement was made in the Presence, and with the Consent of her Father; authorized by solemn Declarations of the Parliament, to the prejudice of the Princes of the Blood, who had a Right to the Succession, according to the pretended Salick Law, tho the *Dauphin* had render'd himself unworthy by the Crime of which he was accused; and all this confirmed twelve years after, at the Coronation of *Henry 6th*, the Son of *Catherine*.

Let us see then what method was taken by *Philip* to establish the Justice of her Right. The President *Jeannin* being arrived at *Madrid*, with Commission from the Catholick League, to implore his assistance against the *Huguenot* Party, who began to grow very formidable, the King let him know, that whereas the Crown of *France* did of right belong to the Infanta his Daughter, if the States of the Kingdom would consent she should be married to the Archduke *Ernest*, he would settle the Low Countrys upon her, in favour of that Match. And when the Estates were assembled at *Paris* in the Year 1593. for the Election of a Catholick King, he gave order to his Ambassadors to present them with a Copy of this Right; but finding them resolved to have no other King than one of their own Nation, he consented, that after the Infanta had been declared Queen, she should marry the Duke of *Guise*, who was a Prince born in *France*, whose Father and Grandfather had preserv'd the Religion of the Kingdom. And tho the Jealousy of the Duke de *Mayenne* broke this second Expedient, yet no Man could perceive, that the Refusal of the League had provoked the King against them, or made him desist from sending them assistance for

for the support of Religion; far enough from prevailing upon him to use his Power (which at that time was almost as formidable, as *Lewis* the 14th's is now) to maintain his Right by force. He had generously maintain'd the Catholick Religion in *France*, with vast expence of Men and Treasure, and by that means neglected the Reduction of *Holland*, which has since brought so many losses upon his Successors. Besides, the King of *Navarr*, who pretended to the Crown as a Prince of the Blood, tho ten Generations remov'd, was a relaps'd Heretick, Head of the *Huguenot* Party, and as such excommunicated by the See of *Rome*, and, which is more, declar'd by the Estates incapable of the Succession. To this we must add, that tho by the First Proposal, *Philip* would have placed the Crown in his Family, yet in requital, its Lustre and Power would have been increased by the Accession of the *Netherlands*: by the Second, he preserv'd the Grandeur of the Nation, without any Diminution or Dismembring; and by both Expedients, secur'd the Catholick Religion against Heresy, which under an heretical King would have been predominant: and that this was his only Aim, appears by what is said.

But to give all the advantages we can to the *French*, let us suppose the Pretensions of the Infanta to have been ill ground'd, which is not so, for we have prov'd the contrary: what would *France* have said, if *Philip* had made use of the Plausibility of that pretext, to begin a War; and if, to attain his ends, he had sacrificed Religion both in *France* and *Holland*, reviv'd the Antient pretensions and National hatred of the *English*, divided the Inland Provinces among the Nobility, and excited all the Neighbouring States to second him,

him, inviting them with such a share of the Frontier Places as they should esteem most convenient for them? What would they have said, if they had seen the Envoys and Ambassadors of *Philip* employing all kind of Intrigues and Artifices in Foreign Courts, to bring them by force or fraud into this unjust Partition, and taking a Deed of Consent from all that would be concern'd, attempting to surprize the Justice of a Conclave, by denying his Suffrage, and that of the Cardinals his Creatures, unless at the price of this shameful Sacrifice? 'Tis in this place that I ought to demand Justice from *France* against her own Example; and accepting her for Judg in her own Cause, require her to pass a just Sentence upon her own Conduct.

This Example of *Philip*, which the *French* cannot deny, clearly demonstrates, that the House of *Austria*, at the utmost height of her Power, was always averse from the use of these pernicious Maxims to satisfy that Ambition, of which she has been so injuriously accused; and by a just comparison, how dangerous that of *France* is to all *Europe*, since she makes no difficulty to prostitute whatever is esteem'd most sacred in human Society. By the same Comparison we may judg where to place that *Umbrage* of too many *Dominions united under one Prince*, which is produc'd in the Treaty for a second Reason of avoiding a War. We may add also, that if *France* was able to maintain her Power and Advantages with so much success in the last, not only against the Forces of the House of *Austria*, but against those of the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, either of which alone would have been formidable to them fifty years ago, no colour of doubt can possibly remain.

If the Crown of *Spain* passes from the Catholick King to the Arch-Duke *Charles*, the House of *Austria* increases not in Power, the State of *Europe* remains the same; and I am perswaded, that all those Nations which the *French* endeavour to fill with Suspicions, will like it so well, that none of them would oppose such a Disposition, if the *French* should lay aside their turbulent Practices.

These *Umbrages* might have been reasonable under the Emperor *Charles V.* who possess'd the Hereditary Dominions of his Family with those of the Crown of *Spain*, especially at a time when *France* was not near so powerful as at this day. But the face of Affairs is so much alter'd since the division of that August Family into two Branches, that even from the time of *Philip* the Second, Son to that great Emperor, and his Successor in the Dominions of *Spain*, her Power began to decline, and consequently that of *France* to rise; which made so great a Progress in a short time, that the most irreconcilable Enemies of the *Austrian* Family, changing the Object of their Fears, made haste to her Defence, astonish'd at the unexpected Change, which convinc'd them in despite of the Illusions of *France*, join'd to all the force of Prepossession, that her Power was far from being establish'd upon so solid a Foundation as that of her Rival. And if *Henry* the Fourth, whom I mention'd before under the name of King of *Navarr*, after his Accession to the Crown, did insinuate to the Protestant Princes and States, that these *Umbrages* and too many Dominions in the two Branches, were a sufficient cause of Jealousy, 'twas in order to flatter their Ambition, and because he knew their ill-will to that August Family, as well out of hatred to the Catholick Religion, as from a desire of enriching themselves

selves with her Spoil. And if, in conformity to these Views, he drew that chimerical Plan of a Christian Commonwealth to be divided into sixteen parts, by which the Catholick King was to be reduced to the Continent of *Spain*, and the *German* Branch to the two *Austria's*, his design was no other than to excite those who were to have any advantage by this dismembring, to enter into the Project with greater Zeal, and to take the principal Profit to himself: An Enterprize that appear'd so full of danger to *Elizabeth* Queen of *England*, that tho she was the chief Protectress of the Protestant Religion, as well as a declar'd Enemy to *Spain*, she commanded her Ambassador to tell him, that if she should ever enter into the Design, the Condition should be, that the *French* should not have one foot of ground more than they already possess'd. Now, if this Caution was thought so necessary, at a time when that Crown was not yet in a condition of giving Jealousy to her Neighbours, and this by a Princess who had so unquestionable an Interest to lessen the Power of *Spain*, what ought to be done at present, when *France* has turn'd the Scale that kept the two Houses equally poiz'd wholly to her own side, and put her self into a condition to oppress all her Neighbours at pleasure? There remains therefore nothing more than to examine those wholesome Measures which the three Allies have jointly taken, to secure the Peace and Tranquillity of *Europe*.

'Twould be superfluous to insert the fourth and sixth Articles, which contain these judicious Measures; or those that follow, which tend to make sure of the Maritim Powers to warrant the Treaty, and to perswade them of the sincerity of *France* in the Execution, as well as to break

No Security in any Treaty to be made with France,

all the Measures that might be taken by the House of *Austria* to defeat the Design. 'Tis sufficient to examine the Substance by the great, to demonstrate that the Promises of the *French* are mere Illusions, made only to attain their Ends, which when they have compass'd, they certainly know that no Guarantees shall be able to stop their Career. So that the matter in dispute is not, whether they will execute the Treaty, or not ; for, being wholly to their advantage, there is no doubt to be made of the Execution : But the Question is, Whether they will keep themselves within the bounds of the Treaty ? which is a thing that all *Europe* cannot warrant. No Treaty was ever made with that Crown during the whole course of the last Age, in which care was not taken to prevent all the *Chicanes* they could possibly ground upon ambiguous Words, difficult Passages, or Irregularities of Stile and Law ; and yet all these Cautions could never hinder them from putting false Interpretations upon the Text, and pretending Nullities in Law, whenever they found it convenient. Thus, to go no higher, they dealt by the Treaty of *Munster*, in which they found out Titles enough to induce them to seize both *Alsatia's*, together with all that lay convenient for their Designs upon the *Saar*, the upper *Rhine* and the *Moselle*. All the Precautions that were taken at the *Pyrenean* Treaty to oblige them to abandon *Portugal*, and to put the Renunciation of the late Queen out of dispute, prov'd ineffectual. And for the Treaties of *Aix la Chapelle* and *Nimeghen*, they violated both, with so little reserve, and so continually, that they seem'd to have acquir'd a right to make Infractions. After these Examples of so fresh a date, what Judgment can be made of this ? Is it conceiv'd in more clear and express Terms ?

Terms? Is the Form more authentick? Have the Treaters taken any Oaths more binding than those made upon the Gospels? Have they found out a new Law of Nations, a new publick Faith, and another Religion? Or, has any one of those Angels that preside over Monarchies, given security for its duration? But if none of these things be, I demand, what means we have left to oblige the French Court to observe this Treaty? Will they change their Genius or Maxims? And shall not the same reason of having got much, serve to intitle them to take more, even by a Rupture?

Things being so, can Men look upon the following Clause stipulated in the fourth Article any otherwise than as a mere Illusion? *The most Christian King, as well in his own Name, as in that of Monsieur the Dauphin, his Male Children, Heirs, and Successors, born or to be born; as also Monsieur the Dauphin for himself and his Children, Male or Female, &c. promise and engage to renounce, at the opening of the said Succession of Spain, as in this case they do at this time renounce, all their Rights and Pretensions to the said Crown of Spain, and to all the other Kingdoms, Islands, &c. all which they shall confirm by solemn Acts, in the most authentick and best form that may be: Or, upon that in the fifteenth Article? All the Acts made in consequence of the Treaty, or that have relation thereunto, and especially the solemn Acts which his most Christian Majesty, and Monsieur the Dauphin, are obliged to give by virtue of the fourth Article, shall be registred in the Parliament of Paris, according to their form and tenure, and usual custom.* If the Marriage-Contracts of the two late Queens of France, and the Acts of Renunciation which they gave upon them, were not so well known, it would be easy to shew by the Contents of the fourth, fifth, and sixth Articles

The Renunciations of the Partition Treaty mere Illusions.

ticles of those Contracts, that none of all these Conditions are there omitted, but on the contrary, so firmly stipulated, and attended with such provisional Clauses, that possibly greater care was never taken on both sides, to establish the security and duration of any Treaty. But because I have already touch'd upon this matter, and the Fact is so notoriously known, I shall content my self to repeat what the *Spaniards* said with so much Wisdom to the Ministers of *France*, during the Negotiations at *Aix la Chappel*: When the Ministers of *France* offer'd from the King their Master, a solemn Renunciation of all his Pretensions to the Crown of *Spain*, on condition they should let him keep what he had usurp'd in the year 1667. those of *Spain* made Answer, That after all the Precautions which had been taken to secure that of the Queen *Maria Teresa*, 'twas in vain to desire any other; for if that was not valid, another would be less so.

The Guarantees not able to secure the Duration of the Treaty.

Upon the same Principle, the Guaranty of the Maritim Powers, and all others that should come in, may be consider'd as another Illusion. It may indeed serve to compel the Emperor to be contented with his Lot, but not to force the *French* King to content himself with his: For when he has taken possession of his Share without any opposition, he will easily be Master of the rest, as I shall evidently prove in the following part of this Discourse.

In every Guaranty there is requir'd, not only a steady and constant Will, but also a Strength sufficient to enforce the Observation of a Treaty; neither of which is to be found here. For as to the Will, can we suppose it constant in *R—G—* who is old, infirm, and, which is more, liable to be cross'd by contrary Dispositions in his People?

Can

Can we suppose it in the *United Provinces*, whose Government is so easily embarrass'd, and who, to obtain a present Peace, will always sacrifice a future Interest? What I here say of these Powers ought to be understood of all the rest, who either are subject to such internal Distempers, as make them unable to exert themselves, or have Enemies abroad, that necessitate them to keep a vigilant Eye upon Affairs at home. In this manner the Triple League, which has made so much noise in the World, was not only insufficient to defend the *Low-Countries* against the Invasions of *France*, but also turn'd to their Oppression, by the Facility which the *French* found to break that Alliance, and to dash the Allies one against the other. And we have lately seen the Guarantees of the Treaty of *Oliva* without motion, upon the Invasion of *Livonia* by the King of *Poland*, preferring their own Interest before all the Obligations of the Treaty. But if we can ground no Expectations upon the Will of the Guarantees, much less can we upon their Force: For besides that they may find Employment at home, or a Diversion abroad, by the Artifices of the *French* Court, I would fain know of what Consideration are the Forces of *England* and *Holland*, in comparison with those of *France*? and for those of the Emperor, they may have work enough to cover his Hereditary Countries against such Enemies as that Crown may arm against him. But let us for once suppose that the *French* will find as many Enemies as in the last War, which yet is utterly impossible; will they not have such an accession of Power, as must needs give them the Superiority? And if no essential Advantage could be obtain'd against them in that, what can we expect in this?

If

*Indignity
and Absur-
dity of the
Motives to
the Treaty.*

If then the Precautions mention'd in the fourth and fifteenth Articles of the Partition Treaty are mere Illusions, and the Guaranty of the two Maritime Powers, with as many more as would engage, so insufficient a Security for performance, what might not be here said of the Indignity and Absurdity of the Motives upon which it is founded? They are full of Compassion for the Sickness of the Catholick King; they cannot *turn their thoughts towards the sad Event of his Death without Affliction, by reason of the sincere and unfeigned Friendship they have for him.* But to what end are these vain Expressions, unless to colour a Conspiracy form'd against his Crown, to put the *French King* into possession of the best part, and refer the rest to his discretion? Then, what can be more absurd than the Motive they alledg, pretending to rectify the Injustice and Enormity of the Partition by their intentions to prevent a War? And who does not see, that by the same Injustice they make it unavoidable? the Emperor's Right, the Interest of *Spain*, and the Security of *Europe* rendring a War indispensably necessary. For to pretend that the Emperor and the Catholick King should submit to the unjust Decree of these new Legislators, is what can never be requir'd of them with any colour of reason. Besides, 'tis the Interest of all Nations, to whom this Treaty is injurious, and like to prove fatal, to make this Cause their own; from whence a War must of necessity ensue, into which all *Europe* will be oblig'd to enter. But suppose these two Monarchs accept the Treaty to prevent a War, which would otherwise break out on this occasion; is the danger of another, much more pernicious, prevented, which may assuredly be expected from *France*, when she is become Mistress of

of her Lot? If the *English* and *Dutch* could by this Treaty sacrifice the Interest of the House of *Austria* and *Europe* to *France*, are they sure others shall not be forc'd to sacrifice them to that Crown by the first Treaty to be made? May not the Empire, the Northern Crowns, and other Nations concern'd in their Preservation, reproach them with their own Example, and excuse the refusal of their Assistance, under the same pretext of preserving the Peace of *Europe*? Let the *Hollanders* above all beware, lest they come to be the first Victims of this Sacrifice; for what would they have done in the War of the Year 1672, if the House of *Austria* had not generously deliver'd them from the Precipice by a speedy Assistance? And what will become of them upon the first * *ill Satisfaction* of the most Christian King, if * *Manifesto* of that Family be no longer in a condition to assist *France* *against Holland* in 1672.

If the Peace and Tranquillity of *Europe* depended absolutely upon the Execution of the Treaty, the Emperor's Right might then be consider'd as a private Advantage, and as such be esteem'd subordinate to the general Good; the contrary of which is most true. For the Interest of his Imperial Majesty is that of all *Europe*, whose Peace and Security depends intirely upon the Preservation of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy in the Person of his second Son; which Truth is but too well prov'd already, and confirm'd even by the disposition of the Partition-Treaty.

In that Treaty the *French* King has stipulated for himself the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, divers Places and Islands situated upon the Coast of *Tuscany*, the City and Marquisat of *Final*, the Province of *Guipuscoa*, &c. all which Kingdoms, Islands, Provinces and Places are to be incorporated

rated with his Crown, together with the Dominions of the Duke of *Lorain*, who in recompence is to receive the Dutchy of *Milan* for himself and his Heirs for ever. The Arch-Duke *Charles* is to have for his Lot *Spain*, with the other Kingdoms, Islands, Dominions, Countries and Places, possess'd at present by the Catholick King as well in *Europe* as elsewhere; but under two Conditions, First, That unless the Emperor accepts the Treaty within the term of three months after he is duly inform'd, the Treaters shall agree upon a Prince to whom his Part shall be given; which is the substance of the 7th Article. Secondly, That this Part shall never be united or remain in the Person of any of his Descendants, or the Descendants of the Emperor, who shall be either Emperor, or King of the *Romans*.

These Conditions thus tack'd to the Lot of the Arch-Duke, being only so many Snares laid by the *French*, as well to make his part insignificant to him, as to have an occasion to seize the Whole into their hands, I shall endeavour to discover the artificial Contrivance of 'em, that none may be misled by them.

The Conditions sub-join'd to the Arch-Duke's Lot, so many Snares to bring it into the Possession of the French.

1. The Lot stipulated for the *Dauphin* is to be incorporated with the Crown of *France*, which is already but too powerful; whereas that of the Emperor is to be the Apannage of a younger Son, and that upon condition never to be united by Succession, or otherwise, to that of the eldest, if he becomes Emperor; which is such a Disproportion, that, supposing the equality of the Lots, excludes all Comparifon in point of Advantage, since that of the *Dauphin* augments the Grandure of *France*, whilst that of the Arch-Duke not only deprives the Emperor of his Right to the whole, but tends directly to overthrow his Power.

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2. The *French* King stipulates for himself what he knows would be most difficult to subdue by Force, *Lorain* only excepted, and leaves to the Arch-Duke the decay'd and ruinous Dominions of *Spain* and the *Low-Countries*, which cannot fail to fall into his own hands as soon as he is in possession of his Lot. That the Conquest of the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily* would be a work of the greatest difficulty, is apparent from the many fruitless Expeditions, which the Kings and Princes of the House of *Anjou* formerly made into those Parts: And therefore considering, that in attempting the Conquest by Sea, he should meet with Dangers from the Winds as well as from Men, besides the difficulty of making a Descent, the prodigious Expence of Fleets sufficient for such an Enterprize, together with the uncertainty of Success in a Country where the Government of *France* is look'd upon with horror; considering also, that to make such an Attempt by Land, he should be necessitated to march his Troops through the midst of *Italy*, which would unite all Parts against him, and give time to the Emperor to send them Assistance; he resolv'd to play a sure game, by comprehending them in his own Lot, that he might have them without a Blow.

3. That the Lot of the Arch-Duke must fall into the hands of the *French* as soon as they are in possession of their part, needs no Proof; since 'tis impossible for this Prince to keep *Spain*, when he can have no Assistance from abroad, nor any Communication with the hereditary Countries of his Family in *Germany*, whilst *France* is Mistress of the Frontiers, as well by her preceding Conquests, as by the design'd dismembring of *Guipuscoa*. In the next place, what Advantage will the *Low-Countries* be to him, unless to serve for a

Theater of eternal Wars with the Crown of *France*, which must of necessity be always triumphant, by reason of the Neighborhood of its Provinces, and the many Places they possess in those parts? In which the two Branches of the House of *Austria* will be intirely exhausted, only to preserve a Barrier for the *Dutch* against the Invasions of *France*, in recompence of the Irreparable Mischiefs they have brought upon their Family. In a word, what will be the Fate of the *Spanish* Provinces in *America*, and the *East Indies*, with the Islands they possess out of *Europe*, unless to become the Scorn of the *French*, *English* and *Dutch* Pirates? for if the *Spaniards* could not secure them in the height of their Power, what will they be able to do in this State of Desolation?

4. The Condition stipulated by the Treaters, to nominate a third Person to the Lot of the Arch-Duke, in case of refusal, can be considered no otherwise than as a double Snare laid by *France* for the Princes of the House of *Austria*, to deprive them by that means of what seem'd to be left them by the Treaty: in this respect more dangerous, because the Emperor could no way avoid it. For if he accepted the Treaty, he offended the Catholick King in the highest degree, and drew upon himself the Hatred of the *Spaniards*, which would certainly have determin'd them to settle the Crown upon a Son of *France*; to which the *French* Court would not have agreed, but upon advantageous Conditions: Possibly, they would have demanded the Low Countrys, under pretence they were troublesom and expensive to *Spain*; together with the Dutchy of *Milan*, to give to the Duke of *Lorain*, in exchange of his Dominions. On the other hand, if the Emperor refused

refused the Treaty, they would proceed to nominate another ; and then, by tampering with all, they would have sold their Suffrage to the highest Bidder.

5. This Condition covers yet a more dangerous Snare than the former ; for the three Powers not presently agreeing upon another Person, the *French* would take advantage, of that delay, and propose the Lot of the Arch-Duke to several Princes, as a Prey to be divided among them ; which would be a means to bring some of them off from their Alliance with the House of *Austria*, and to make others neglect their true Interest, in this great alteration of Affairs. So that if the Catholic King comes to die in this conjuncture, which is much to be fear'd, the *French* alone being in Arms, and their Forces already posted upon the Frontiers of *Spain*, they may easily make themselves Masters of the Seat of the Monarchy, and by that means secure the Conquest of the Rest : for 'tis not to be presum'd, that the *Spaniards*, under so great a Consternation, would sacrifice their Estates, Families and Fortunes, to keep the Places, in which they command, for the Arch-Duke, when they see him excluded from the Crown ; and if any of them should be so zealous, how could they be sure of the Fidelity of the Garisons that serve under them ?

6. The *French* may not only take advantage of this Delay, to seduce some and amuse others, whilst they fortify their Party in *Spain*, as well by their Intrigues, as by the Terror of their Arms : but the Opportunities they would have in the principal Courts of *Europe*, to lure them into their Interest, or at least to persuade them to enter into the Guaranty of the Treaty, would no less contribute to facilitate their grand Design. And 'tis

'tis to be fear'd, that by these means they may engage such a Party, that both *England* and *Holland* would find difficult to break, whenever they shall return to their true Interest. 'Tis well known what Divisions reign in the Empire, and in the North, and how many several ways the *French* have to give the Emperor trouble, even in the remotest parts of *Germany*.

7. If R—G— by the Scheme of the Partition, design'd to interest the House of *Austria* in the Defence of the Low Countrys, without rendring them too powerful there; and at the same time, to oblige the *French* to turn the Strength of their Arms from that Frontier, by engaging them in an *Italian* War, 'tis certain he could not take any Measures less conducing to that End. For if all the Power of that House could not maintain those Provinces against *France*, confin'd to its own limits; what can now be done, after so vast an addition of new Acquisitions? And who can tell, whether the people of those Countrys, weary of suffering as much by the fruitless and burdensom Succours of the Maritim Powers, as from the Invasions of *France*, will not desperately throw themselves into the Arms of that Crown? Then as to the Diversion pretended in *Italy*, if the *French* King becomes Master of *Spain*, either for himself or one of his Family, to which things seem to tend more and more every day; either he will find little difficulty in seizing the *Spanish* Dominions in *Italy* as accessional to the Head, for the Reason I mention'd before; or else there will be no diversion at all. But if, on the other hand, the Treaty produce its effect, and the two Branches of the House of *Austria* be depriv'd of a Mutual Communication, *France* furnish'd with means both of diverting the Emperor's Arms by
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an intestine War, and embarrassing the Affairs of the two Maritim Powers, a War in Italy can neither be difficult nor lasting. Besides, the Success of *France* in that Country, will deprive those Powers for ever of their whole Trade to the *Levant*, as I shall show presently.

Tho the Points last mentioned are sufficient to alarm all *Europe*, if the approaching Dangers be duly consider'd ; yet the Court of *France* is so indefatigable in using all her Arts to disguise or conceal the dismal Prospect, that I think my self obliged to discover the common Peril, and to prove with demonstration, that tho the *French* King should not get one foot of ground upon the Death of his Catholick Majesty ; yet if he can procure his Dominions to be divided, such a Dismembring alone would place *France* in the Throne of the Universal Monarchy, to which she has such a vehement desire.

If the *French* scatter their Treasures in all the Courts of *Europe* ; if they amuse one part, and draw the other into their Interests ; if they imbroil people on all sides, only for the sake of imbroiling ; if they maintain great Armies, which exhaust their Country ; in a word, if they move Heaven and Hell, to make as many Enemies to the Emperor as they can, and to seduce his Allies, no Man ought to wonder. For this is a Master-game ; and if they succeed, they will be reimburs'd with Interest, and become absolute Arbitrators of *Europe*. The great business of *France* is to triumph over her Rival, which cannot fail, if she be permitted to tear up the Foundations of her Power, by dismembring the Dominions of the *Spanish* Monarchy : for so soon as the House of *Austria* shall cease to be the Ballance of her Power, no other Bank will be capable of puting a stop to her Rapidity and Violence.

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Violence. And here I cannot but wonder at certain speculative Politicians, who either through Humour or Prepossession, look upon the Danger without Concern, relying upon trivial, antiquated and unseasonable Maxims. They will wait for a Remedy from time, which will either never come, or will come too late; and they doubt no more of Revolutions, which depend intirely upon Chance, than they do of Evangelical Truths; even inferring from the present Grandure and Elevation of *France*, a necessity of her approaching Ruin. If these Enthusiastick Politicians had well examin'd the present State of *Europe* and that of *France*, I am sure they would reason in another manner. But I shall only desire they would consider the Example of the *Ottoman* Empire, and then blush at their own Indiscretion: For if this vast Power has already continued above four Ages, 'tis to be presum'd that of *France* may last longer, especially considering all those Maxims so proper for Conquest, which she has not only copied from thence, but taken care to observe in the most punctual manner, both at home and abroad: 'tis therefore their business to consider, whether this kind of Government will agree with them or not, for they must determine, and that speedily.

Advantages of the French Lot.

As the Execution of the Partition seems to be the grand Object of the two Maritim Powers, 'tis necessary to shew what Advantages the *French* will obtain by their Lot, in order to their grand Design, which is to render that of the Arch-Duke so burdensom to him and his Family, as may pave the way for them to seize it upon the first War. I shall begin with the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, which are the first in order.

In this place if we only consider the fruitfulness and abundance of all things in those Kingdoms, and the use *France* will make of them when they are reduced to the foot of the *French* Government, 'tis certain, to go no farther, that they will be more advantageous to them than all *Spain* under the present Desolation will be to the Arch-Duke. These two Kingdoms, which were called the Nurseries of antient *Rome*, and justly esteem'd such by *Rome* modern, will plentifully furnish their Armies both by Sea and Land: And if they have been worth to the *Spaniards* four Millions of Crowns by year, we may modestly compute they will be worth six to the *French*. But their Ambition will not be satisfied with this single Advantage, they aim at the Conquest of all *Italy*, and those Kingdoms will facilitate their Design, and render them so formidable in the *Mediterranean*, that no other Nation shall dare to show themselves upon that Sea without their permission.

The *French* have always consider'd the Conquest of *Italy* as more conducing to accomplish their grand Designs, than any other; this was the Motive of all those Attempts they formerly made upon the Duchy of *Milan* and Kingdom of *Naples*, as the most proper places to begin their Enterprize. But what Conquests soever they had the fortune to make there, they could never preserve them for want of a Communication with *France*, which was always disputed either by Sea or Land. The History of the Reigns of *Charles* the VIIIth, *Lewis* XII. and *Francis* I. are full of the Relations of those Attempts, and of the ill Success that follow'd them. And if the Revolutions ensuing in *France* from the death of *Henry* the Second, Son and Successor to *Francis* I. to the

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grand Pacification under *Henry* the Fourth, put them out of a condition of having any such thoughts : Yet no sooner was the Kingdom quieted within, but those Designs were again reviv'd. The Duke of *Savoy* was the first that felt their Arms, and was forc'd to save himself by a disadvantageous Treaty. They did more under *Lewis* the XIIIth, Son to *Henry* : For tho he was often imbarass'd by intestine Revolts, yet he carried a War into *Italy*, and secur'd himself a Passage into those Countries by the Acquisition of *Pignerol*, after he had fail'd in his design upon *Casal*, which would have extended the Line to the middle of *Lombardy*. But the Measures which have been taken under the present Reign, could not have fail'd to succeed, if they themselves had not given occasion to break them : For having consider'd, that without a Line of Communication they should never make any lasting Conquests, they saw this Line must be drawn quite down the *Po* to the *Adriatick* Sea, by which *Lombardy* would be divided, and they in a condition to act as they found convenient, on the one or the other side. They were in possession of *Pignerol*, which lies at the foot of the *Alps*, and gave them an easy entrance; and the next step they were to take was to post themselves somewhat lower. To this purpose the City of *Casal* seem'd most convenient, because strong by Nature, situated upon the *Po*, and commanding the *Milanese* and *Montferrat* : Accordingly they purchas'd it at a dear rate of the Duke of *Mantua*, and after they had fortified it with the utmost care, made it their Magazine, and fill'd it with all kind of Ammunition ; they cast their Eye upon *Guaftalla*, situated a little lower upon the same River, and treated with the Duke who was Proprietor, for liberty
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to fortify, and put a *French* Garifon into that place also. This Design, which was laid with great Circumspection, could not have fail'd to make the *French* King Master of *Lombardy*, and consequently of all *Italy*, to which that Dutchy serves for an Outguard. For tho there are many important Places between *Cazal* and *Guaftalla*, such as *Valenza*, *Pavia*, *Alexandria*, and *Berselli*, they could not have held out long against so great a Power, taken up only in this War; and on the other hand, furnished with means sufficient to divert the Forces of the Emperor and Catholick King in other places.

But whatever the *French* have lost by embracing too much at once, they recover again with interest, and without a Blow by the Treaty. The Project, I just now mention'd, would have been attended with some difficulty; the Attack was to be made on the Stronger part of *Italy*; great Rivers were in the way; divers fortified Places to be taken; all which would have given time to the Catholick King to reinforce his Troops, and to the Emperor to assist him. But if the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily* come once into their hands, and the State of *Milan* into those of a Prince of little Power, like the Duke of *Lorain*, what can hinder them from subduing all *Italy* when they please? 'Tis an undeniable Truth, that *Italy* alone cannot resist the *French*. But grant they could raise an equal number of Troops to oppose them, which is impossible, they would always be inferior in goodness: for what hopes can they ground upon Men raised in haste, without Discipline and without Officers; besides the Disorder and Confusion, which will be found in a Conjunction of divers small Bodies of Men, drawn from the several States that compose that Country, each

of them having particular Views, and distinct Interests? For these Reasons 'tis absolutely necessary to have foreign Assistance to save *Italy*: and from whence shall it be obtain'd, unless from the Emperor, or King of *Spain*? But how shall their Succours be introduc'd, without a Line of Communication between the two Branches, and without a Foot of Land to subsist them? Nothing could hinder *Francis* the 1st from subduing *Savoy* and *Piedmont*, which are the Ramparts of *Italy*, at a time when his Forces were balanc'd by those of *Charles* the 5th, and for the most part inferior; nor, in succeeding times, *Henry* the 4th, and *Lewis* the 13th from filling *Lombardy* with their Troops, and rendring themselves Arbitrators of all differences, tho the Catholick King had then very considerable Armies in the State of *Milan*, which might be continually re-inforc'd by Assistance from *Germany*. In a Word, nothing has been able to hinder *Lewis* the 14th from exercising a despotick Authority in *Italy*, during the whole course of his Reign, especially in *Rome*, and against the Dignity of that See; that others might learn submission by their Example. *Italy* has never been so much insulted by *France*, as under his Reign. He carried his indignation so high against the *Corse* Guard in the time of *Alexander* the 7th, that the Pope was compell'd to purchase an Ignominious Peace, to save the Country from the Fury of his Arms. And all Men know, how incessantly he persecuted *Innocent* the 11th after the most enormous and scandalous manner, as well in his Ecclesiastical Superiority, as his Temporal Sovereignty; maintaining in *Rome* a Sanctuary for the worst of Criminals, by open force, in contempt of the Supreme Authority, and the Laws of the City.

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He went yet farther, and attack'd him in his Person, procuring him to be declar'd, by an Arrest forc'd from the Parliament of *Paris*, to be a *Jansenist*, a *Visionary*, a *Quietist*, and a Favourer of Hereticks ; and this Piece he caus'd to be publish'd throughout all the Towns of his Kingdom. All these Persecutions were endured with exemplary patience ; and yet the Pope's Crime was no other, than that he assisted the Emperor against the *Turk* : but that was a Crime which in the Sense of *France* could not be punished with too great severity. What shall I say of the Bombarding of *Genova*, which was executed by his order, under the most frivolous pretext ? and yet a Reparation extorted from that Republick, in so haughty a Manner, as shew'd a Design of signaling the Affront by another of a more mortifying nature. What might not be said of his despotick way of treating the Duke of *Savoy*, who was so nearly related to him, and lived in a most respectful dependance upon him, prescribing such things as tended to the Ruin of his Dominions and Family, as all the World saw, when he endeavour'd to send him to *Portugal* for a Wife, who by detaining him in that Country, might give the Crown of *France* an Opportunity of making all sure in *Savoy*, under the Name of his Mother. Did he not also forbid the Uncle of the said Duke to marry without his consent, which perhaps he would never have given ; that when the Reigning Branch should come to be extinguish'd, he might substitute the other, consisting of Princes born in *France*, who should purchase his Protection at a dear rate ? These things have been done lately, and I only mention them by the way, to shew what may be expected when ever the *French* grow powerful in *Italy*. For if they have exercised so

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despotical an Authority in that Country, at a time when the Catholick King by his own Force, and with the Assistance of the Emperor, was able to put a Stop to the Violence of their Arms, what will they not do, when this Support shall fail, and they attack the *Italians* in front by the way of *Lombardy*, in the Rear by the Kingdoms of *Naples*, and on the Flank by the Ports of *Tuscany*? This I leave to the Consideration of all those Princes and States, who are concern'd, that they may take such measures as are necessary to preuent the Danger. They may be inform'd by a *Spanish* Discourse publish'd the last Month, of the Calamities which threaten them from *France*, if they suffer that Nation to make nearer Approaches, by possessing themselves of the Two Kingdoms in question. And therefore to avoid prolixity, I refer them to that Writing, in which care is taken to acquaint them with the Evils impending over each of them in particular.

Spain cannot
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nions in
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But if *Italy* be not able to resist *France*, without the Assistance of the Emperor, and Catholick King, *Spain* will be much less able under an Archduke, depriv'd of his Dominions in *Italy*, and without any communication with the other Branch of his Family in *Germany*. All men know the Desolation of *Spain*, in respect of Treasure, Men, Manufactures and Trade; which must be supplied by other Nations: not that these things might not be produced by a little more pains and labour; but then, in order to that end, Impositions would be necessary, after the Mode of *France*, to awaken the industry of the People, which the natural goodness of their Kings, as long as they have any of the House of *Austria*, will, we presume, always prevent. So that the *Spaniards* are poor in the midst of those vast Treasures,

wares yearly brought from *America*, which they suffer to pass through their own hands to enrich their Neighbours, and especially the *French* who are their natural Enemies. Their Men, who were formerly admir'd, and accounted the best Infantry of *Europe*, have now no disposition to Arms, by reason either of the Disorders introduced into their Military Oeconomy, or the Irregularities of the Publick Administration. They apply themselves neither to Arts, nor Trade, chusing rather to live meanly without labour, than to grow rich by a less commodious industry; which slothful temper has been fomented by their five last Kings, who having great Resources from abroad, supplied their indigence by great profusions; and when the principal Revenues of the Crown were not sufficient, they engag'd and alienated the very Funds to support that Charge. So that if men consider the exhausted condition of *Spain*, separate from the many Aids she receives from abroad, they can hardly believe, what History tells them of the Forces and Power of some of her antient Kings, in times when they had not half the Continent of that Country, and no kind of Assistance from any other part.

These wants have been hitherto in great measure supplied by their Dominions in *Italy*, which have enabled the *Spaniards* to sustain all the Assaults of *France*; more especially under the two last Kings. And this Conjunction of Forces is of farther importance, by facilitating the Succours of the Emperor, which are become absolutely necessary to *Spain*, since the formidable increase of the *French* Power. In that view, the Catholick Kings have been always extreamly jealous of preserving this Communication, and therefore have consider'd the Ports of *Tuscany*, tho in appearance

rance of small moment, as one of the brightest Jewels of their Crown.

Importance
of the Tus-
can Ports.

These Ports lying between the Kingdom of *Naples* and the Place of *Final*, which opens a Passage into the Dutchy of *Milan*, secure a Communication between *Spain* and *Italy* by Sea, without disturbing any of those Powers, that lie in the way by Land; as they serve in like manner to draw a Line of mutual assistance between the two Branches of the House of *Austria*, which is the Security of both: and on this Account, the *French* did all they could, under the last Reign, to possess themselves of these Ports; and had not fail'd of success, if a Distemper produced by the badness of the Air, had not ruin'd their Army. 'Tis for the same reason that they have stipulated 'em by the Treaty for themselves; and are so much afraid of mistaking, that after they have comprehended them in general terms, they specify each under its proper Name. These same Ports, which have been formerly call'd the Manacles of *Italy*, in hatred to the *Spaniards*, will become really so in the Hands of *France*; who doubtless will use them with dexterity enough, to enslave all the Rest of that Continent. For being Masters at Sea, nothing will be more easy, than to attack *Tuscany* by that way, whilst their Land Armies possess themselves of the Ecclesiastical State on one side, and of *Piedmont* and *Lombardy* on the other.

If the *French* pretend the *Tuscan* Ports, as accessional to the two Kingdoms that are to be incorporated, and necessary to preserve a mutual communication, no Man ought to be surpris'd, for they are of great use to them. But if they have no other view, why do they not leave the Marquisat of *Final* to the Duke of *Lorain*, being

a part of the State of *Milan*, which they have stipulated for him by the Treaty, since the little Port, or rather Road that belongs to that Place, is of no consideration to secure the Command of that Sea? The Reason is evident, for they look upon *Milan* only as a thing deposited in the Hands of the Duke, which they may take when they will, and therefore resolve to keep the Keys, that they may enter when 'tis convenient.

These measures so judiciously taken, prove evidently, that the *French* have a design, not only upon *Italy*, but *Spain* also, when in the Hands of the Arch-Duke: for what Forces can he oppose against *France*, in that wretched Condition to which his Kingdom will be reduced, without all hope of Assistance either from *Italy* or *Germany*? The two last Kings, with both these Advantages, have not been able to secure their Frontiers against the Power of the Crown, since *Lewis 13th* took the County of *Roussillon*, and advanc'd his Conquest to *Lerida*; and *Lewis the 14th*, when almost all *Europe* was confederated against him, forc'd *Barcelona*, and possess'd himself of *Catalonia*. But if the *French* could carry their Arms so far at a time when *Spain* had such great Assistances from abroad, what will they do when their Strength is increas'd, by the addition of those Places which were a considerable part of that Aid, but attack that Kingdom by the three Passages of the *Pyrenean* Mountains, whilst they keep the whole Coast in a continual Alarm by their Fleets? These three attacks by Land will be easy at all times, because they will be made by a Line of Communication, which no foreign Power can interrupt: Besides, they may take what time they please for Preparation, and make their Attempt in the profoundest Peace, according to

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their new Maxims. As to the Coast of Spain, what Places are there in a Condition to resist? There's only *Barcelona*, *Cadix*, *St. Sebastian*, and *Fontarabia*, that require a formal Siege: Of all the rest, there is not one which may not be forced in few days, by a single Detachment, whilst the *French* are Masters at Sea. But what difficulty can there be in taking the four Places last mention'd, when *Barcelona*, which is the most considerable, could not be fav'd in the last War, tho defended by a numerous Garison, disciplin'd, and well commanded; tho there was an Army near to reinforce them with Men, and give the Enemy diversion, who never employ'd the sixth part of their Forces in that Siege? *Cadix* will be easily forc'd, by sending a Fleet into the Gulf, and landing a competent number of Men to make an Attack at the Neck of Land, on which it is situated; and having Bombs in readiness, to lay the Town in Ashes, in case of Resistance.

Importance
of the Pro-
vince of
Guipuscoa
to France.

Possibly, they would find more difficulty in taking *Fontarabia* and *St. Sebastian*; the first of which Places they formerly besieg'd in vain: and the principal Reason of this difficulty is, That the Avenues of that Frontier are almost impenetrable, as well by reason of the Mountains that cover them, as the personal Valour of the Inhabitants, who have always maintain'd themselves from all foreign Power, as the *Romans*, and in after Ages the *Mores* experienced to their Shame. But let the *French* alone, they have taken Care of that by the Treaty; for they have there, in express Terms, stipulated for *France* the whole Province of *Guipuscoa*, in which both those Places lie, and are so fearful they should not be sufficiently understood, that they have nam'd them in particular, as well as the Port of *Passage* which lies between

between them. By this precaution they make sure of that Frontier, which is bounded by the Ocean, and is the only part of *Spain* secure from Danger, and able to stop the course of their Arms. As for the Port of *Rassage*, tho used by the People of the Country only for Fishing, the Court of *France*, not without Reason, has been pleas'd to give it a mark of distinction, by the word *Especiality*. For no Place will be of more Advantage to them, capacious enough to contain the greatest Fleet, and secur'd from all dangerous Winds; the Hills and Country round about cover'd with Oaks of great bigness, and ready at hand for building Ships of War. Which Advantages are so much the more considerable to the *French*, because they have no Port in all that Sea, where they are to be found in equal proportion.

But 'tis not enough for the *French* to become Masters of this haughty Frontier, which has hitherto put a stop to their Fury, to acquire a Port which has no equal in the Ocean, and to bring under their Power the most warlike People of all *Spain*, as well as the most proper for the Sea. There are many other Mountains and Passes, in the way to *Victoria*, where the Plains begin, among others that of *S. Adrian*; and because these might prove dangerous or inconvenient upon Occasion, they have wisely and dexterously obviated all in the same Article; for after they have stipulated the Province of *Guipuscoa*, as I mention'd before, they proceed in their business thus, *With this restriction only, That if there be any Places in like manner, depending upon the Provinces subjected to Spain, which are on this side the Pyrenees, or other Mountains of Navar, Alava, or Biscay, on this side the Province of Guipuscoa, they shall remain to France; and the said Mountains, together with these*

that lie between the said Province of Guipuscoa, Navar, Alava, and Biscay, to whomsoever they belong, shall be divided between France and Spain, so as there shall remain as much of the said Mountains to France on her side, as to Spain on the other. The French in this place use the word *Restriction* in a wrong sense; they would have explain'd their meaning better, by that of *Extension*, which in this place serves to express the enlargement of their Frontier far beyond *Guipuscoa*. But not to dispute about words, we may consider this Expression as relating to a second intention of *France*, which she reserves for a source of *Chicane*, that will admirably serve her designs.

It will come to be necessary, to explain what is meant by the *Pyrenees*; and here they lie in wait for the *Spaniards*. If the long Chain of Mountains, which separates *Spain* from *France*, be understood by that name, the sense will be clear; every Map will guide us, and the *French* put themselves under the Obligation of restoring *Roussillon* to *Spain*, because it lies on the *Spanish* side of that Chain. But if the question be extended so far as to measure the breadth of the Mountains, and to give one half to the *French*, this would carry them a great way; and besides the Province of *Guipuscoa*, give them footing in all the adjacent Countries, by comprehending in their Share, whatever Posts or Passes lie convenient for them, in *Biscay*, *Alava*, and *Navar*. Their Geographers will presently find, that all the Mountains of these Countries are part of the *Pyrenees*; and if the *Spaniards* will not be convinc'd, their Armies are ready to prove the Assertion; and then by the help of a few Dependencies, they will easily carry a Frontier as far as the Plain, which is the thing they pretend.

In this manner the *French* cover their Designs; but the Veil is so thin, that if Men look near, they will soon see through it. If they come to be Masters of *Biscay* by the means of *Guipuscoa*, and post themselves near *Victoria* by the Extensions I have mention'd, what should hinder them from advancing to *Madrid*? *Catalonia* is open, and *Navar* defended only by the Citadel of *Pampelona*. The execution of this design is not difficult; for the *French* have never made a question of finding Forces sufficient to conquer *Spain*, but of subsisting those Forces in their long marches, through Countries half deserted, and without any Communication of Rivers: And against this they will be able to provide, by being Masters of both Seas, and of all the Passes of the Frontier. Therefore if they have never doubted of this Conquest, except for the Reasons before mention'd, what can stand in their way when those Reasons cease, and *Spain* is depriv'd of all Assistance from abroad, and attack'd both by Sea and Land? which ought to be well consider'd by that Nation.

But the Conquest of the Continents of *Spain* ^{Naples} and *Italy*, is not all the Advantage which *France* ^{and Sicily} expects from her Lot. This Conquest may be thought remote, and as such, not much to concern the two Maritime Powers: But there is another that touches them in a particular manner, which is, that this Lot makes the *French* absolute Masters of the *Mediterranean*, and consequently of all the Trade to the *Levant*, which will contribute no less to increase their Power, than the Addition of so many Dominions. I have already shew'd, how easily they will possess themselves of the Ports of *Spain*; so that we are now only to consider if there are any belonging to that part of *Italy*, which is not comprehended in their

their Lot, that will be capable of putting a stop to their Power.

The principal of these Ports are *Genoa* and *Leghorn*. Now I ask, whether those to whom they belong, either can, or dare resist the *French*, when the rest is under their Dependance, or upon the point of being so? But 'tis no way necessary they should be Masters of all the Ports of *Spain* and *Italy*. On the contrary, they would be burdenson to them, by the Expence of new Fortifications, and numerous Garisons. 'Tis sufficient to be Masters of that Sea, in order to accomplish their Designs: for by taking either *Ceuta* or *Tangier* from the *Moors*, which lie at the Mouth of the *Straits*, and keeping there a good Squadron of Ships and Gallies, they will easily be able to shut up that Passage from any other Nation. But grant that the Fleet of some other Nation should force this Passage, either by the Advantage of a Wind, or by Surprise, what security would they find in the Ports of *Spain* and *Italy*, where the Fleets of *France* may attack them at all times? Or what shelter against the Violence of a Storm? I do not aggravate the thing; for 'tis well known the *French* have been superior on that Sea, ever since they have applied themselves to Maritim Affairs, in which they are now arriv'd to that Perfection, as to be able to dispute the Empire of the Ocean with the two Maritim Powers, who were formerly in undisputed Possession: And therefore 'tis easy to determine what will be the Event, when they have increas'd their Naval Power to a third part more than it is, by the Addition of *Naples* and *Sicily*.

Let no Man think to object, that *Spain* will have Ships, as well as *France*, and that those of the Maritim Powers will not fail to assist her upon

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Occasion, from a knowledg of their own Interest: for we are but too well inform'd of the miserable Condition of the *Spanish* Fleets; since when ever the present King resolv'd to arm by Sea, he has been necessitated to buy Ships in *Holland*, and to raise the greatest part of the Mariners in his Dominions of *Italy* and *Biscay*, which are now to be torn from *Spain*. But suppose the *Spaniards* able to fit out a considerable Fleet, would not the *French* destroy it in a little time, not only by exceeding them in number, but also because that of *Spain* will always be inferior in Experience, Discipline, and Oeconomy? And as to the Assistance to be expected from the Maritim Powers, the last War is sufficient proof, how little can be relied upon in a pressing Necessity; for of what use were the united Squadrons of *England* and *Holland*, that came and posted themselves at *Cadiz*? They possibly might prevent some great Disaster, but could not preserve the *Spaniards* from suffering many losses by the *French*.

Whilst these Squadrons were sitting out, and in their Passage, the *French* had already executed their Designs. And if they were found to be superior in Force, that of *France* retir'd into Harbour: But if their Strength was equal, both sides put out to Sea, and endeavouring to get the Wind, and other Advantages of their respective Enemies, spent the Summer in a pickeering War, when the *French* had no more to do than to make for their own Ports; whereas the Confederates were either forc'd to winter at *Cadiz*, with great loss of Men, that perish'd by the change of Air and Diet, and a prodigious expence of Treasure; or to return home through all the Dangers of the *Biscayan* Sea, and perhaps a *French* Fleet, well mann'd, and fresh, attending them in their Passage.

Passage. Now if this foreign Aid was so useful to *Spain*, at a time when all her Ports, and those of *Italy* were open to them; what a Change will there be, when none but the first are remaining, and those too in the utmost danger from *France*?

If the *French* once come to be absolute Masters of the *Mediterranean*, as will infallibly happen if the Treaty produce its Effect, 'tis certain they will suffer no Nation to share with them in the *Levant* Trade, which they esteem to be the best and most useful in many respects. They had a great share in this Commerce, before they were so powerful at Sea, notwithstanding all the endeavours of the *English* and *Dutch* to exclude them; from whence we may conclude, they will suffer no Competitors, when none will be able to contend. The situation of *France*, the convenience of its Ports, and industry of the People, have given them more Advantages in this Trade than any other Nation: for being near at hand, they have been able to perform their Voyages in half the time, and consequently with half the Expence, which has enabled them to sell the produce of their Goods much cheaper; whereas other trading Nations have double the way to make: and as they are expos'd to greater Dangers, stand oblig'd to increase their Ship's Company, and frequently to guard them with Convoys, which very much diminishes the Profit.

But let it be granted, that *France*, out of her especial Grace and Favour to the Maritim Powers, as well as to keep fair with them in the Ocean, will suffer their trading Ships to pass through the *Straits*; they must expect to be exposed to Searches and Confiscations, under pretence of contraband Goods, and to pay Toll for going in and out, with a thousand other Impositions, which the

the *French* know how to use, as well with their own Subjects, as with Foreigners. In the next place, their principal Trade consisting in the Manufactures of Wool and Silk, 'tis not enough considered, how many ways the *French* will find to render them of little or no Advantage. *Italy* neither can, nor dare furnish them with Silk, if the *French* will have it, in order to be manufactur'd in *France*; and to bring it from the *Levant* will not only be chargeable, but dangerous; which with the Toll that must be paid, will render all their Silk Manufactures unprofitable: whereas those of *France* will be much cheaper, and consequently sell better. Then as to the Manufactures of Wool, I ask, who can hinder the *French* from appropriating to themselves all the Wools of *Spain*, which are absolutely necessary to the making of the finest Cloth; the Ports of that Kingdom being at their discretion, and it may be already in their Hands? Besides, to what Market shall the Cloth that is made be sent? There will be great Danger, and little Profit in the *Levant*: the *French* will forbid them in all their Dominions, and the rest of *Europe*, already accustomed to take the silk Manufactures of that Kingdom, will soon accustom themselves to buy their Cloth also.

○ If Men should object, That tho the *English* and *Dutch* Trade to the *Levant* should fail, that of the Ocean, where they are the strongest, would make amends; that there is business enough in the *West-Indies* to employ their Shipping; and that if they remain united, they may exclude the *French* from those parts of the World. I answer, first we are to know, whether those Nations design to trade under the dependance of *Spain*, by loading their Effects on board the Gallions, as formerly, or
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wholly independant. In the First case, 'tis certain that *France* alone, having more Goods proper for that Trade than both those Nations, and being able to sell cheaper, will have the greatest Profit. And, which is yet more, if that Crown will demand of *Spain* the sole Liberty of that Trade, they will find no difficulty to exclude the other Two. For when the *French* shall attain to that Degree of Power, to which the Treaty of Partition; or, if this fail, the Admission of a *French* Prince into the Throne of *Spain*, must necessarily raise them, they will govern the Springs of that Monarchy as they please, because they will be their only support, and defence. So that if they think fit, that the *Spaniards* shall continue to bring the Riches of *America* for the Use of *France*, they will oblige them to exclude all others: and then 'twill be their part to take care to secure the Gallions from the Danger of any other Power; to effect which, the increase of their Strength at Sea, by the Union of *Naples*, *Sicily* and *Biscay*, to that Crown, will very much contribute. At this rate they will be able to manage *Spain*, and undertake the Defence of their Possessions in *America*, in expectation of a proper Conjunction, to unite the whole Monarchy to the Crown of *France*.

But if these Powers pretend to trade to those Parts, in a manner wholly independant, they will have for their Enemies, not only *Spain* and *France*, but even the Natives of those vast Countrys; who being all Catholicks, and perhaps more zealous than those of *Europe*, will always be most inclin'd to those of their own Religion. They may indeed make a Pyratrical War, seize Places and establish Colonies, but none of these will be safe nor lasting, as the late Enterprize upon

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on *Darien* has sufficiently prov'd. Yet possibly they may have some advantages in the *East-Indies*, where the *Dutch* are powerful, which may not not be disputed at first. But the Difficulty will lie in securing themselves in time of War; and they may justly fear, that the *French* may without leaving their own Coast, take from them that which they shall with so much hazard, pains and expence, have brought thither. And this, by reason of the apparent Advantages they have over these two Nations, both by their Situation, and the Commodiousness of their Ports upon the Ocean. For their Ships must of necessity pass along by the Coasts of *France*, before they can arrive in their own Ports; and the *French* can put to Sea almost with any Wind. So that they may without difficulty waylay and surprize them in their passage as they return from the *Indies* with their Lading. They will either be constantly inform'd, by corresponding every where, of the times of their departure; or seldom fail in their Conjectures, by knowing the Seasons, and the rising of the Trading Winds. They will guess, by computing the Passage, how far their Ships may probably have reach'd; and then, taking their time to cruize upon them, they will sooner have made a Seizure, than the *English* themselves, who yet are nearest, will be in a Condition to protect them: Especially because so many different Winds are absolutely necessary to carry out their Ships, as well clear of their Ports as of the Channel. 'Twas chiefly by these Advantages, that the *French* took so many Prizes from the two Nations in the last War; and they will be always in a Condition to do the same, whenever they resolve to make a Pyratrical War by Sea.

France
in the Ac-
quisition of
Lorain.

I come now to the last Condition of the Treaty; which gives the Dutchy of *Milan* to the Duke of *Lorain*, in exchange of his own Dominions. We are to suppose, that the *French*, who know their own interest, and stop at nothing which tends to that end, were moved by very powerful reasons, to prefer those Dominions, before a Dutchy they have taken so much pains to obtain formerly. I have already said, that we are not to think any otherwise of the Dutchy of *Milan*, than of a thing deposited in the Hands of the Duke of *Lorain*, in order to resume it at pleasure, and that the *French* have, for this purpose, reserv'd to themselves the Marquisat of *Final*. Let us see what may be more in this Project.

That *Lorain* is of great Use to the *French*, in the Design they have long since laid, of carrying their Frontier to the *Rhine*, has been sufficiently seen, in the great Advantages they have receiv'd by that Country, during the the whole time of their Usurpation.

1. The Union of *Lorain* with *France*, advances their Frontier forty Leagues into the Empire; for so many there are from the Extremity of the Dutchy of *Bar*, to the City of *Strasburg*; makes them Masters of all the Country between the *Queisich*, the *Saar*, and the *Moselle*; opens a way into the *Palatinat*, and into the Territories of *Mentz* and *Trier*.

2. This Dutchy secures the Communication of *France* with the County of *Burgundy*, and the two *Alsacia's*; is situated at the Head of the *Moselle*, and the *Meuse*, and therefore cannot but be extremely Commodious as well to preserve their old Conquests as to make new ones. Here they may assemble their Forces, to distribute them in every part, make Provision of Corn to fill their Magazines

quarters, to be ready to act upon the *Rhine*, before their Enemies can take the Field. 'Tis hard to imagine greater Advantages than these; and if we add to all, that out of this Country twenty five thousand Men are rais'd and paid, we shall find, that the *French* have reason, in this conjuncture, to prefer the Possession of it before the Dutchy of *Milan*. Besides, if they had pretend'd this, in conjunction with the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, they would not only have driven the Princes and States of *Italy* to despair, but alarm'd the whole Body of the *Switzers*, with whom they will always keep fair, till they have lock'd them in on all sides. Thus keeping a steady Eye upon their Ends, they affect a little moderation on one side, and know how to make themselves Amends with interest on the other.

'Tis true, the Condition of the Duke of *Lorain* seems to be made better by the Exchange; as well in Revenue, which will be much greater, as because he will have *Savoy* and *Piedmont* for his Outworks, against the Insults of *France*. But who can tell, whether the *French* King, when he is in full possession of his Lot, will not challenge the State of *Milan* for himself, if the Partition take effect, or for the Young Prince, that may be called to the Succession of *Spain*? He seiz'd *Lorain*, because 'twas serviceable to his designs against the Empire. He will now have it again, by means of the State of *Milan*, which in this conjuncture is of less importance, and serves to dissipate the Jealousies I have mention'd. When this design is accomplish'd, and the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily* in his own Hands, or else at his Disposal, under the Name of one of his Grandsons, called to the Crown of *Spain*, he will not fail

fail to resume the Duchy of *Milan*, to establish his Authority in *Lombardy*: and by the same Law he now transplants the Duke of *Lorain* thither, he may transplant him again into some other Dominions more remote, which by that time he may have usurp'd: or perhaps by a particular favour will send him back to *Lorain*, where he will not fail to keep him safe; leave him the Name of Duke in Formality, and reserve the Sovereignty to himself. 'Tis impossible to judg, what Men will do, except only by what they have done; *France* will always have the same Genius, the same Conduct, the same Ambition.

The Treasurers could not dispose of Lorain, without the Consent of the Emperor and Empire. In the last Place, we are to inquire, whether the Treasurers could stipulate these Exchanges, without the Consent of the Emperor and Empire, who were not consulted in the Matter. *Lorain* is under the Protection of the Empire; possesses divers Lands in Fee from the Empire, and acknowledges its Majesty in three essential Points, which are, the Right of safe Conduct; the Common Peace; and Contributions, in case of Publick necessity, or a War against the *Turk*, one third Part only less than an Elector. Now, as it is not the Interest of the Empire, that *France*, which is already so Formidable, and upon the Point of becoming much more so, should possess these Dominions, which serve for an Outwall to cover it; and that *Strasburg* was yielded to the *French*, by a kind of Equivalent, for the Restitution of *Lorain*; 'tis not to be presumed, that the Empire should consent to this Alienation: Especially considering, that the *French* do in this openly violate the Treaty of *Reswick*, what Protestation soever they make in the beginning of the Partition Treaty to observe it inviolably.

What

What I have said concerning *Lorain*, is yet of greater Force, in respect to *Milan*, which is a Fee of the Empire; settled by the Emperor *Charles* the 5th upon his Son *Philip* the Second, to be enjoy'd by him and his; and not to serve for Sport, to *France* and her Allies. Besides, upon failure of the Male Line, Daughters having a Right to a certain degree, 'tis apparent that if the Catholick King die without Children, this Fee will devolve upon the Emperor, as well by the Right of Representation, derived from the Empress *Mary*, his Mother, Daughter to *Philip* the Third, and Sister to Queen *Ann* of *Austria*, who did renounce; as by subrogation to the Right of the Empress *Margaret*, his first Wife, who was Sister to Queen *Martha Teresa*, that did likewise renounce. To which ought to be added, that, as Emperor, he is under an obligation to prevent this important Fee from falling into the Hands of *France*, or of any Prince in her Interests. Since then the Right will be in the Emperor, 'tis presumed, he will dispose of that Dutchy in favour of the Arch-Duke *Charles*, his second Son, whether he be called to the Crown of *Spain*, or not. The Interest of all *Italy*, and of the whole *Helvetian* Body demands this; which is so visible, that to give any proof, were to light a Candle to the Sun.

Having already shew'd the principal Advantages of the *French* Lot, 'twould be useless to enlarge upon that of the Arch-Duke, since the disproportion is so apparent, and the Treaters themselves were so much afraid of the Comparison, that after they had named *Spain*, they left the rest to conjecture, comprehending all under the general terms, of *Kingdoms*, *Islands*, *States*, *Countries*, and *Places* possess'd at present by the Catholic King,

King, as well without as within Europe, which are not in the Lot of France. But 'tis impossible to mistake, if Men will be pleas'd to make a little Reflection; *Spain* dismembred; the poor remains of the *Low-Countries*, without defence, and altogether unprovided; *Sardigna* without hopes of Assistance from *Italy*; *America* expos'd to the insults of all Nations, that have a Sea-force; and what the *Spaniards* possess in the *East-Indies*, at the Discretion of the *Dutch*. These scatter'd pieces in the state they are, cannot possibly be long in the possession of an Arch-Duke: and to this Condition the *French* resolv'd to reduce *Spain*, either that they might accomplish their Conquest upon the first War, or compel the Nation to accept one of their Princes, to the exclusion of the Emperor and his Right.

That this was the intention of the *French* Court, is but too manifest by their whole Conduct, and the means they have us'd ever since the Treaty of *Reswick*, to fix the necessity of this Alternative. That Peace serv'd to disarm and divide their Enemies; that Disarming and Division produc'd the Treaty of Partition, and this Treaty finish'd the Work, and brought the *Spaniards* to despair, when they saw themselves not only abandon'd, but sacrific'd to *France*, by the Maritime Powers; and all this attended with the terror of a *French* Invasion, which they were no way able to resist. Thus forcing one Party by the other, the *French* secur'd to themselves the Liberty of chusing; with this additional Advantage, that, when the Emperor should refuse the Treaty, which they knew he would do, for the Reasons before mention'd, they might be furnish'd with a Pretext to excuse themselves in not adhering to the Partition, if *Spain* should call one of their Princes to
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the Crown. But if this should happen, what would *Rome* and the *Dutch* say, who have not only given occasion to the Treaty, but, in that case, have been Gall'd by *France*? I doubt not, the *French* will presently come with protestations of the utmost Sincerity, and specious offers, to calm their resentment, and dissipate their just suspicions. For they must have time to fix themselves in *Spain*; to bring the Government either by force or fraud, into their interests, and to break the Measures of the Emperor, if he pretend to sustain his right by Arms: and to gain this time, they will not fail to use their greatest Art. As to what relates to *Spain*, they are thoroughly prepar'd; their Forces are already upon the Frontiers; their Fleets in a Posture, to alarm the Coasts both of that Kingdom and of *Italy*, upon the first orders; and, which is more, a great Party about the Catholick King, to influence him, to make a Will in their favour. And if we add to all this, the ill State of the *Spanish* Frontiers, the Disorder and Confusion of the Government, the dispirited condition of the Nation, and the General desolation of the Kingdom, we have great reason to believe, they will do what they please in little time. And then, let all Men judg, what will be the fate of the Rest of *Europe*, especially of those, who by their situation are most expos'd to their invasions, as the Empire, the two Maritim Powers, the *Switzers*, and the Principalities of *Italy*.

And, because the Relapse of the Catholick King, which happen'd the 21st of *October*, may probably carry him to the Grave; and open the dark Intrigue of that grand Scene, to which the Treaty of Partition was a Prelude, I think my

self oblig'd to stop here, and rest satisfied, that I have proved in this first part, the enormous Injustice, and pernicious Consequences of dismem-
bring the *Spanish* Monarchy: for all Men will see, that if the Balance of the Two Crowns, so necessary to *Europe*, be for ever broken by the Partition, the Reason will be yet stronger, if a Son of *France* should intrude into the Throne, as we are threatened: because in that case, *France* would attain to such a Degree of Power, as would enable her to enslave all *Europe*. And if any doubt remains to be resolv'd touching this last point, I shall do it in a Second part, which will soon follow, if the thing happen: tho' I cannot persuade my self, that the *Spaniards* should ever be so ill advis'd, or so base, as to enter into this Project. Besides, 'tis not in their power to exclude the Emperor, who is call'd to the Succession, by all kind of Rights and Settlements, as they themselves have maintain'd, with so much reason, against the *French*. On the other hand, the Constancy of his Imperial Majesty, in refusing to accept the Treaty of Partition, notwithstanding all the Solicitations and Menaces of the Treaters, ought to be a sufficient evidence, without the Decision of a *Solomon*, that the Crown belongs to him, as the true Father, and Guardian of the People.

F I N I S.

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